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CONSULTATION OR CONSENT:   
THE UNITED STATES’ DUTY TO CONFER WITH AMERICAN 
INDIAN GOVERNMENTS 
 
ROBERT J. MILLER* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the current international law movement to require 
nations/states to consult with Indigenous peoples before undertaking actions 
that impact Indigenous nations and communities.  The United Nations took 
a significant step in this area of law in September 2007 when the General 
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
The Declaration contains many provisions requiring states to confer and 
consult with Indigenous peoples, and in many instances, to obtain their 
“free, prior, and informed consent.”  This article undertakes an original and 
detailed investigation into how the free, prior, and informed consent 
standard emerged in the drafting of the Declaration. 
But this article also points out that consultations and obtaining the 
consent of Indigenous peoples is nothing new in the political and diplomatic 
relations between American Indian nations and the United States. From the 
very founding of the United States, it has maintained a government-to-
government relationship with Indian tribes.  This is expressly recognized in 
the U.S. Constitution and is reflected in hundreds of U.S./Indian treaties and 
in the history of the interactions between these governments.  A nearly 
constant stream of formal and informal consultations and diplomatic 
dealings has marked this relationship. 
In recent decades, though, the international community has begun 
focusing on consultations with Indigenous peoples and has increased the 
international law obligation on states to consult.  The international regime is 
also moving far beyond mere consultations and is requiring states to obtain 
the free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous peoples.  On the 
surface, requiring the United States to obtain the informed consent of Indian 
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nations and peoples, before undertaking actions that affect them, might be 
more onerous than just consulting with tribal governments. 
This article examines the history and modern-day processes for United 
States consultations with Indian nations and the emerging international law 
standard of free, prior, and informed consent.  The article argues that the 
United States should continue and even enhance the consent paradigm that 
has always been the goal of federal/tribal relations.  And, the article also 
argues that the United States should have little trouble adapting to the new 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The political existence of the American Indian nations and their 
government-to-government relationship with the United States is expressly 
recognized in the U.S. Constitution.1  The long history of the interactions 
between these governments is marked by diplomatic efforts to resolve 
disputes and address common interests.2  A nearly constant stream of 
formal and informal consultations and diplomatic dealings has marked this 
relationship.  Tribal governments and Indian peoples are very interested in 
seeing this mutually respectful relationship continue and even be enhanced 
and improved in the future. 
In recent decades, the international community has demonstrated one-
way consultations between the federal government and tribal governments 
could be changed and perhaps improved.  The international law regime is 
moving beyond mere consultations with indigenous peoples to what is 
known as “free, prior and informed consent.”3  On the surface, requiring the 
United States to obtain the informed consent of Indian nations and peoples, 
before undertaking actions that affect Indians, is far more complicated, and 
perhaps onerous, than just consulting with tribal governments and Indians. 
In lieu of those potential difficulties, the United States to date has only seen 
fit to attempt to improve its consultation processes and has mostly ignored 
the emerging free, prior, and informed consent paradigm. 
This article examines the history and modern-day processes for United 
States consultations with Indian nations and the emerging international law 
standard of free, prior, and informed consent (“FPIC”).  This article argues 
that the United States should continue and even enhance the consent 
requirement that has been the goal of federal/tribal relations since the birth 
of the United States.  Overall, the United States should have little trouble 
absorbing and adapting to the new international consent legal movement. 
Mere consultation with American Indian nations, without obtaining 
consent, does not fulfill the United States’ legal duties to Indian nations, nor 
does it honor the history of the United States’ diplomatic relationship with 
tribal governments or the emerging FPIC standard. 
 
1. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. VI, cl. 2; amend. 14, § 2. 
2. See infra Part II. 
3. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 19 (Sept. 13, 20007) (“States shall consult and cooperate 
in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions 
in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing 
legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.”). 
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Part II lays out the history of consultation and consent between 
American Indian governments and the United States and the modern-day 
legal basis for a federal duty to consult.  Part III then dissects the current 
efforts by the United States to implement and improve its consultation 
processes with Indian nations.  Part IV examines the recent development in 
international law of the standard of FPIC, which moves significantly 
beyond mere consultations.  This Part undertakes an original and detailed 
investigation into how FPIC emerged into international law through the 
process of drafting the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. Finally, Part V concludes with the author’s opinions on the future 
of U.S./Indian consultation policies and how they should conform to the 
FPIC standard. 
II.  THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FEDERAL CONSULTATIONS 
WITH TRIBAL NATIONS 
Long before Europeans began colonizing North America, indigenous 
peoples and Indian nations governed themselves through various 
governmental entities.  These entitles ranged from informal structures for 
quasi-family bands of nomadic hunter/gatherers to very complex and even 
hierarchical and authoritarian governments for large and settled 
populations.  For example, Indian nations in the Mississippi Valley, the 
Adena and Hopewell cultures from 1000 BCE to 500 CE in what is now 
modern-day Ohio, and the Ancestral Puebloans in the American Southwest 
governed themselves through political entities that possessed the power to 
mobilize labor and manufacture, to build roads and cities that included 
urban areas and populations, to build enormous residential and ceremonial 
structures, and to practice elaborate burials of elite leaders.4  The city of 
Cahokia, near modern day St. Louis,5 existed from 900–1400 CE and had 
an estimated population at its highpoint of 15,000–38,000.6  The earthen 
 
4. ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY 13, 19-20 (2012) [hereinafter MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”] (citing 2,000 
year old irrigation canal systems near modern-day Phoenix); CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: NEW 
REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS 41-42, 288-90 (2005); Neal Salisbury, The 
Indians’ Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans, in AMERICAN 
ENCOUNTERS: NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS FROM EUROPEAN CONTACT TO INDIAN REMOVAL 
1500-1850, at 5, 7-10 (Peter C. Mancall & James H. Merrell eds., 2000); MICHELE STRUTIN, 
CHACO: A CULTURAL LEGACY 34-35, 50-51 (1994); LYNDA NORENE SHAFFER, NATIVE 
AMERICANS BEFORE 1492: THE MOUNDBUILDING CENTERS OF THE EASTERN WOODLANDS 3, 
20-28, 33-38, 40-45 (Kevin Reilly ed., 1992); Stephen H. Lekson, The Chaco Canyon Community, 
SCI. AM., July 1988, at 108; FOOD, FIBER, AND THE ARID LANDS 58 (William G. McGinnies et al 
eds., 1971).  
5. SHAFFER, supra note 4, at 51. 
6. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FRONTIER: ECONOMIC EXPLORATIONS INTO NATIVE AMERICAN 
HISTORY 87 (Linda Barrington ed., 1999); SHAFFER, supra note 4, at 53. 
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ceremonial mound that the Cahokians built is the world’s largest 
earthwork.7  Moreover, French accounts of the Natchez culture in the lower 
Mississippi region demonstrate it was ruled by a royal lineage and leading 
citizens were carried in litters.8  Some tribal governments also taxed their 
citizens and held public monies and crops in public treasuries.9 
Most Indian nations interacted politically with other tribes and many 
created tribal confederations for mutual protection and other benefits.10  For 
example, the Hadenosaunee or Iroquois Confederacy was a federalist 
governing system devised by the Five, and later Six, Nations (Oneida, 
Onondaga, Seneca, Mohawk, Cayuga, and Tuscarora) in what is now 
upstate New York to control their intra-tribal and international relations.11 
They met in an annual congress to decide internal and international legal 
and political issues.12  Many other Indian governments also developed 
sophisticated regimes, including democratic and governance principles, 
such as the separation of powers between branches of government and 
 
 7.  SHAFFER, supra note 4, at 51. 
8. Id. at 62-67. 
9. 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (NORTHEAST) 384 (William C. Sturtevant 
et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS] (explaining that 
some clans and villages established a “public treasury” to which everyone contributed and was 
administered by a chief for public purposes); ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 13-14 (1970) (noting public storehouses controlled by town chiefs in the Creek 
and Cherokee Tribes were for public needs). 
10. See generally DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL ORDER AND POLITICAL CHANGE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS AMONG THE CHEROKEE, THE CHOCTAW, THE CHICKASAW, 
AND THE CREEK (1992); COLIN G. CALLOWAY, CROWN AND CALUMET: BRITISH-INDIAN 
RELATIONS, 1783-1815, at 14, 32, 45, 55 (1987) (mentioning Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw, 
Cherokee, Miami, Shawnee, and Delaware created powerful, multi-tribal confederacies); VINE 
DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 85-86 (1983); 
DOROTHY V. JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE: COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY AMERICA 34-35 
(1982). 
11. BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN INDIAN HELPED 
SHAPE DEMOCRACY 8-10 (1982); 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 9, at 
314-17, 418-33; DONALD A. GRINDE, JR., THE IROQUOIS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN 
NATION 62-80 (1977); Frank Gouldsmith Speck, THE IROQUOIS: A STUDY IN CULTURAL 
EVOLUTION 23 (1st ed. 1945); JONES, supra note 10, at 21; OLIVER MORTON DICKERSON, 
AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 1696-1765, at 336 (1912) (the confederacy held the balance 
of power for several centuries in North America); see generally LEWIS H. MORGAN, ANCIENT 
SOCIETY (1877). The Confederacy dates from at least the fifteenth century and was fully 
developed when the French encountered it in 1630. JONES, supra note 10, at 23; FRANCIS 
JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE: THE COVENANT CHAIN CONFEDERATION OF 
INDIAN TRIBES WITH ENGLISH COLONIES FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE LANCASTER TREATY OF 
1744, at 39 (1984) (Iroquois League was formed between 1400–1600 CE); 15 HANDBOOK OF 
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 9, at 418. Others argue it was fully formed by the twelfth 
century. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, PENNSYLVANIA, AND THE FIRST NATIONS: THE TREATIES OF 
1736–62, at 6 (Susan Kalter ed., 2006). 
12. 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 9, at 420, 433. 
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between civil and military powers.13  In many of these tribal governing 
systems, female leaders exercised important powers.14  Tribal governments 
often engaged in negotiations with other Indian nations regarding 
diplomatic affairs and trade, and many entered into agreements like 
treaties.15 
Negotiating, entering agreements, and engaging in diplomacy with 
other governments was a regular practice of American Indian nations.  It is 
not surprising, then, that all of the European countries that attempted 
colonization in North America dealt with the Indigenous nations as political 
entities that possessed sovereign governing powers.16  England and the 
English colonies, for example, signed scores of treaties with tribes on the 
east coast of North America, engaged in extensive diplomatic relations with 
Indians, and in England, the Crown even received diplomatic visits from 
North American tribal representatives.17  Spain signed up to twenty treaties 
with Indian nations, across what are now the southeast and southwest areas 
of the United States.18  France and Holland also engaged in diplomatic 
relations with Indigenous peoples and entered treaties with Indian nations to 
buy land, to engage in trade, and to ensure peace.19  These arrangements 
 
13. Id. at 156, 216, 261, 314-17, 418-41, 610, 627, 640, 684, 782; Robert J. Miller, American 
Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and Its Framers, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133, 
143-46 (1993) [hereinafter Miller, American Indian Influence]; RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND 
THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 24 (1975); ANGIE DEBO, THE ROAD TO 
DISAPPEARANCE: A HISTORY OF THE CREEK INDIANS 6 (1941). 
14. Miller, American Indian Influence, supra note 13, at 144-45; Renee Jacobs, 
Note, Iroquois Great Law of Peace and the United States Constitution: How the Founding 
Fathers Ignored the Clan Mothers, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497 (1991); 15 HANDBOOK OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 9, at 216, 261, 617-18, 627, 684, 782.  
15.  See, e.g., 1 VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN 
INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979, at 6-8, 681-744 
(1999). 
16. JONES, supra note 10, at 84-85 (“Long before 1765, observers were recording well-
defined territorial limits for the various Indian groups north of the Ohio and east of the 
Mississippi. Associated with these limits were clear and commonly accepted ideas of trespass, as 
well as of permissive use by outsiders.”). 
17. JEFFREY GLOVER, PAPER SOVEREIGNS: ANGLO-NATIVE TREATIES AND THE LAW OF 
NATIONS, 1604-1664, at 15, 29, 59, 91, 99, 133, 188 (2014); FRANKLIN, supra note 11, at 11-14, 
35, 160, 185, 226, 308, 358, 369; 4 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (HISTORY OF 
INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS) 128-43, 185-94, 211-29 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988); 
CALLOWAY, supra note 10, at 66; JENNINGS, supra note 11, at 156, 236, 241, 259; see generally 
HENRY F. DE PUY, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE ENGLISH COLONIAL TREATIES WITH THE AMERICAN 
INDIANS: INCLUDING A SYNOPSIS OF EACH TREATY (Martino Pub. 1999) (1917). 
18. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL 
ANOMALY 59 (1994) [hereinafter PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES]; 1 DELORIA & 
DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 6, 103, 106-07.  
19. 1 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 6; ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, 
DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY 
22 (2006) [hereinafter MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA] (noting the Dutch colonies entered treaties and 
transacted with the Indian Nations); JENNINGS, supra note 11, at 53-54 (Dutch treaty with the 
Mohawks in 1643).  
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were based, needless to say, on extensive and prior consultations and 
consent by both parties before the agreements were considered binding.20 
The English colonies that developed on the east coast of the present-
day United States signed dozens, if not hundreds, of treaties with Indian 
tribes regarding land, trade, jurisdiction, and peace.21  In addition, most of 
the colonies were involved in nearly continuous diplomatic interactions and 
negotiations with Indian nations.22  The records of the diplomatic sessions 
and treaties that Benjamin Franklin published regarding just the colony of 
Pennsylvania, and only for the years 1736–1762, exemplify the broad 
extent of these colonial diplomatic activities with Indian nations.23 
Obviously, the treaty agreements that resulted from these efforts were 
preceded by lengthy consultation sessions and were based on the mutual 
consent of the parties. 
A. THE UNITED STATES AND INDIAN NATIONS CONSENSUAL TREATY 
RELATIONS 1774–1871 
In September 1774, the thirteen English/American colonies created 
their first national government, the loosely organized Continental Congress. 
It is not surprising that this government continued the English, European, 
and colonial practice of dealing with Indian nations as sovereign 
governments via diplomatic, political, and treaty-making processes.24  From 
its very beginning, the United States government realized it had to deal with 
the tribal nations to ensure its survival and success.25  Thus, the United 
States took a very conciliatory and respectful position vis-à-vis Indian 
tribes.  For example, in the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress 
continually pleaded with tribal governments to stay neutral or to join the 
 
20. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 10, at 3. 
21. See generally EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 
(Alden T. Vaughan ed., 1979–2003) (consisting of 20 volumes); PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN 
TREATIES, supra note 18, at 21; DE PUY, supra note 17; JONES, supra note 10, at 14, 26-30, 53, 
70, 75, 89. 
22. See, e.g., Miller, American Indian Influence, supra note 13, at 135-36; JONES, supra note 
10, at 89; see generally FRANKLIN, supra note 11. 
23. See generally FRANKLIN, supra note 11; JONES, supra note 10, at 58-59. 
24. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 18, at 21, 23. 
25. Dickerson, supra note 11, at 336; XVIII EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: 
TREATIES AND LAW, supra note 21, at 1-3, 39, 43, 59-60, 63-65, 68-71, 84-85, 98-114, 124; 
Miller, American Indian Influence, supra note 13, at 137-39; THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON: COLONIAL SERIES VOL. 4, NOVEMBER 1756–OCTOBER 1757, 192-94 (W.W. 
Abbot ed., 1988); JOHANSEN, supra note 11, at 65 (quoting Benjamin Franklin); FRANCIS 
JENNINGS, EMPIRE OF FORTUNE: CROWNS, COLONIES, AND TRIBES IN THE SEVEN YEARS WAR IN 
AMERICA 88 (1988); PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798, at 67-68 
(1956); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 549 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 
34 (1831) (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
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U.S. side.26  In addition, in 1778 this Congress requested permission before 
crossing Delaware Nation territory to attack the British.  This treaty with 
the Delaware even offered them the opportunity to join the Union as a 
state.27 
The thirteen American states then convened a new Congress in 1781 
under a written constitution called the Articles of Confederation.  This 
Congress was granted “the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . 
regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians.”28  This 
Congress took steps to exclude the states from Indian affairs and continued 
the colonial and Continental Congress practice of negotiating with tribal 
governments over trade, peace, and land purchases, and it ultimately 
entered at least eight treaties with Indian nations from 1784–1789.29 
In 1789, the United States began operating under our current 
Constitution. Article I grants Congress the sole authority to deal with Indian 
tribes.30  This Constitution also includes a treaty clause, which ratified the 
previous nine treaties the Continental and Articles of Confederation 
Congresses had entered with tribal nations, authorized future federal/tribal 
treaty making, and made treaties “the supreme Law of the Land.”31 
Indian tribes were very important to the existence and development of 
the nascent United States.32  Indian nations were powerful, numerous, and 
 
26. XVIII EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAW, supra note 21, at 1-
2; GRINDE, supra note 11, at 62-80; PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 18, at 23; 
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE 
AMERICAN INDIANS 35-36, 39-42 (1995 ed.) [hereinafter PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER].  
27. Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13 art. 6, reprinted in 2 INDIAN 
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 3-5 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904) [hereinafter INDIAN AFFAIRS].   
28. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX (1781); but see Miller, American Indian 
Influence, supra note 13, at 151-52 (“[T]he Articles of Confederation proved inadequate in 
maintaining uniformity among the states and creating a federal Indian policy.”) 
29. Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
supra note 27, at 5-6; Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16, reprinted in id. at 
6-8; Treaty with the Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, reprinted in id. at 8-11; Treaty with the 
Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21, reprinted in id. at 11-14; Treaty with the Chickasaw, Jan. 10, 
1786, 7 Stat. 24, reprinted in id. at 14-16; Treaty with the Shawnee, Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26, 
reprinted in id. at 16-18; Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 28, reprinted in id. at 
18-23; Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 33, reprinted in id. at 23-25; cf. 1 
DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 15 (arguing that the Confederation Congress entered 
into at least eleven treaties with tribes from 1783–1789); see also MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, 
supra note 19, at 39-43. 
30.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Robert J. Miller, American Indians and the United States 
Constitution (2000), at 5, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573144 (last 
visited August 5, 2015); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 277 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al eds., 2012 ed.) [hereinafter COHEN’S]. 
32. “Most American history has been written as if history were a function solely of white 
culture - in spite of the fact that till well into the nineteenth century the Indians were one of the 
principal determinants of historical events.” A. Irving Hallowell, The Backwash of the Frontier: 
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located within, and on, the borders of the United States.  The United States 
was heavily involved in Indian affairs, diplomacy, and treaty making in its 
early decades.33  And President George Washington quickly established 
many of the Indian treaty procedures that came into practice.  He showed 
great respect for Indian treaties and handled them in the same fashion as he 
did international treaties.34  
Ultimately, the United States entered 366 (or more) treaties with Indian 
nations from 1789–1871.35  These treaties were entered after extensive 
negotiations and consultations and only with the consent of the tribal 
governments.  The Senate would sometimes reject treaties agreed to by 
tribes and the Executive Branch, and vice versa, tribal nations rejected 
treaties proposed by federal officials; occasionally, the Senate referred 
treaties back to a tribal government to consider changes the Senate insisted 
upon.36  Some of the treaties contained provisions that any future 
amendments required the consent of the tribe; often the requirement was 
that three-quarters of the adult males of the tribe had to consent.37 
Obviously, these treaties required intelligent negotiation and mutual consent 
by both parties.38  Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has 
analogized Indian treaties to international treaties and called them 
“contracts between nations.”39 
 
The Impact of the Indian on American Culture, in THE FRONTIER IN PERSPECTIVE 230 (Walker D. 
Wyman & Clifton B. Kroeber eds., 1957) (quoting Bernard DeVoto).  
33. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 18, at 2-4 (stating that from the 
beginning, the U.S. recognized the autonomy of Indian tribes and that treaties rested on the 
concept of Indian sovereignty).  
34. Id. at 67, 72-73.  
35. KAPPLER REVISITED: AN INDEX AND BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO AMERICAN INDIAN 
TREATIES 7 (Charles D. Bernholz ed., 2003); PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 
18, at 446-502. See also 1 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 3-5 (arguing that hundreds of 
other agreements qualify as Indian treaties). 
36. See, e.g., 2 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 745-1083. Cf. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
supra note 27, at 145, 162 (Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., 1817, art. 6, 7 Stat. 160 and Treaty 
with the Wyandot, Etc., 1818, art. 1, 7 Stat. 178).   
37. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 69 (1999); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).  
38. Indian treaties involved real negotiations and consent situations: “[T]he stereotype of 
Indian leaders at treaty talks as being passive and overmatched intellectually is wrong. . . . The 
calculus was about power, and the tribes could make the calculations as well as the white people. 
The tribal negotiators were sophisticated and they used every technique and device available to 
them.”  Charles F. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Rights and the National Forests: The Case of the 
Aboriginal Lands of the Nez Perce Tribe, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 435, 438 (1998).  
39. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 
675 (1979). 
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B. UNITED STATES AND INDIAN CONSENSUAL RELATIONS POST-
TREATY MAKING 
In 1871, Congress ended treaty making with tribes.40  This occurred not 
due to any change in the status of tribal nations but because of 
congressional infighting: the House of Representatives demanded a greater 
role in Indian affairs.41  Even though the treaty era ended, political, 
diplomatic, and consensual relations between the entities continued 
unabated.42  In fact, U.S./Indian agreements after 1871 were still often 
called treaties by many, and they continued to be negotiated by the 
Executive Branch and ratified by Congress.43  The only difference after 
1871 was that both houses of Congress had to approve the agreements as 
statutes before they became binding.  This procedure and these agreements 
are called treaty substitutes by scholars.44 
Congress continued to spend enormous amounts of time and money 
sending commissioners to tribal governments, negotiating with tribes on 
various issues, formulating Indian policies, and enacting legislation 
regarding the tribal nations.45  Tribes continued to consult with and petition 
Congress regarding important issues.46 
In addition, in more modern times, 1982–2010 in particular, federal, 
state, and tribal governments have been involved in decades of negotiations 
regarding water rights and have often reached agreements that Congress 
later enacted into laws.47  These arrangements look remarkably like treaties. 
A bit earlier, the Executive Branch and tribal and state governments were 
also involved in extensive negotiations over native claims to lands and 
rights in Alaska and in the eastern United States, and Congress also enacted 
 
40. Act of March 3, 1871, § 1, 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71). This act expressly 
did not “invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made . . . .” Id.  
41. PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 530-32; COHEN’s, supra note 31, at 69-70; 
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1975). 
42. PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 532, 676; see also Oregon Dept. of Fish and 
Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985) (noting the Klamath Tribe and the United 
States negotiated a 1901 agreement to modify the boundaries of the reservation that had been 
established in 1864 treaty; Congress ratified the agreement). 
43. 1 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 287; PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 
26, at 532, 676.   
44. 1 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 15, at 1; PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, 
supra note 18, at 312. 
45. See, e.g., Indian Department Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 125, 32 Stat. 245-77 (May 27, 
1902); PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 687-1208 (covering the history and political 
interactions between the United States and Indian tribes 1871 to 1994). 
46. See, e.g., PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 759-896, 917-92, 1017-23, 1087-
1190; United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 384 (1980).   
47. See generally DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER 
SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA (2002); Peter W. Sly & Cheryl A. Maier, Indian 
Water Settlements and EPA, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 1991, at 23, 24. 
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those agreements into law.48  Consequently, “treaty making” and the 
historical, consensual, diplomatic relationship between Indian nations and 
the United States have continued beyond the official end of treaty making 
in 1871. 
C. FEDERAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND THE CONSENSUAL 
U.S./INDIAN RELATIONSHIP 1774–2015 
In addition to the Executive Branch and Senate exercising the treaty 
power to reach agreements with tribal nations, and the federal/tribal conduct 
post-1871, Congress has also enacted numerous laws requiring consultation 
and consent in Indian affairs.  For example, in furtherance of the paradigm 
of diplomatic relations with Indian nations, in 1787 the Articles of 
Confederation Congress enacted the Northwest Ordinance to provide for the 
future incorporation of the lands in the Northwest Territory into the United 
States.49  This law expressly continued the consensual relationship the 
United States had maintained with Indian governments; the Act promises 
that the United States will always negotiate with Indian nations to obtain 
their consent for purchases of tribal lands: “The utmost good faith shall 
always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and property shall 
never be taken from them without their consent . . . .”50  In 1848, Congress 
applied this Act, and this consensual relationship, to the Indian nations in 
the Oregon country.51 
Even in federal policies that ultimately had negative effects on Indian 
country, Congress regularly required the Executive Branch to engage in 
prior consultations with tribes and to obtain consent.  In the Removal Act of 
1830, Congress instituted a policy attempting to remove all eastern tribes 
west of the Mississippi River.52  Congress, however, predicated removals 
on consultation, negotiation, and the consent of the tribes: “the President . . 
. [may] cause so much of any territory belonging to the United States, west 
 
48. Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (1980); Rhode 
Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92 Stat. 813 (1978); COHEN’s, supra 
note 31, at 326-30 (discussing Alaska native settlement act); PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 
26, at 1172-74 (discussing tribal land claims settlement acts for the Narragansetts in Rhode Island 
and the Passamaquoddies and Penobscots in Maine). 
49. PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 
xiii, 3, 15, 25, 46 (Indiana University Press 1992). The Northwest Territory is now the modern day 
states of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. 
50. DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 9 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 
2000) (emphasis added). See also Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835) 
(“[P]ossession could not be taken without [Indian] consent.”).  
51. See Organic Act, § 14, 9 Stat. 323 (1848).  
52. See Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830), reprinted in 3 THE AMERICAN INDIAN 
AND THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 2169-71 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 
1973). 
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of the river Mississippi . . . to be divided . . . for the reception of such tribes 
or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange the lands where they now 
reside, and remove there; . . .”53  And, several decades later, under the 
Allotment Act of 1887, Congress required tribal consultations and consent 
before reservations could be allotted and before land on reservations could 
be purchased by the United States.54  As part of the allotment process, the 
Secretary of the Interior negotiated with tribes over the individual allotment 
plans for each specific reservation.55  Congress continued to believe that 
allotting reservations required a tribe’s consent until the United States 
Supreme Court, in essence, held otherwise in 1903.56 
In 1899, 1901, and 1904 Congress began authorizing rights-of-way 
through Indian reservations.57  Later, Congress and various agency reg-
ulations began requiring the consent of tribes before a grant or renewal of 
rights-of-way.58  In the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), Congress 
repeated its policy of favoring tribal consultation and consent.59  Congress 
invited tribal governments through the IRA to consider drafting 
constitutions and organizing their governments under those documents.60 
Consultation and consent took the form of tribal communities debating 
whether to enter this process61 and then holding at least two elections before 
a written tribal constitution could become operative.  First, the community 
had to vote whether to agree to organize under the IRA; second, the 
 
53. Id. See also PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 179-213; COHEN’S, supra note 
31, at 41-51.  
54. See Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2012) (“[I]t shall be lawful for the 
Secretary of the Interior  to negotiate . . . for the purchase . . . of such portions of its reservation 
not allotted as such tribe shall, from time to time, consent to sell . . . .”); DELORIA & WILKINS, 
supra note 37, at 60-61 (noting the Allotment Act required the Executive Branch to obtain tribal 
consent and to negotiate to purchase Indians’ remaining lands).  
55. PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 668, 867. 
56. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 467 (1984).  Congress enacted allotment acts reservation 
by reservation “with each surplus land act employing its own statutory language, the product of a 
unique set of tribal negotiation and legislative compromise.”  Id.  But after Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), Congress enacted allotment acts without consultation or consent. 
PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 867-69. 
57. Act of Mar. 2, 1899, 30 Stat. 990 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 312) (2012)); 25 
U.S.C. § 311 (2012). See also PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 344-45, 401, 869 n.14; 
COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 319, 1062-65. 
58. 25 U.S.C. § 324 (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(a) (2015). See also 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 
(2012); 25 C.F.R. pt. 169 (2015). 
59. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 
(2012)). The senator who introduced the bill stated that it would give Indians and tribes control 
over their own affairs. 78 Cong. Rec. 11,125 (1934). 
60. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 
(2012)). 
61. See ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 258-59 (2000); Tribal Self-Government and the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955, 964-65 (1972). 
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community had to draft a constitution and then consult with the Secretary of 
Interior to gain approval of their constitution as drafted; and third, the 
community had to hold a second election whether or not to adopt the 
constitution after it had been approved by the Secretary.62 
In the current era of federal Indian policy, called the Self-
Determination Era, President Richard Nixon reemphasized consultation and 
consent as the federal model for working with Indian nations.  Nixon stated 
that the federal government should ask Indian nations what the federal 
government should do for them, and with them, instead of the United States 
dictating policies and programs: 
It is long past time that the Indian policies of the Federal 
government began to recognize and build upon the capacities and 
insights of the Indian people. . . . [W]e must begin to act on the 
basis of what the Indians themselves have long been telling us. 
The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create 
the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is 
determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.63 
In response, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) began immediately 
drafting procedures for consulting with Indian nations and finalized its 
policy in 1972.64  Congress also accepted President Nixon’s call when it 
enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
(“ISDA”) in 1975 and allowed tribes to negotiate with the United States to 
assume the operation of federal Indian programs.65  Congress also required 
the Secretaries of the Interior and of Health, Education, and Welfare to 
consult with Indian organizations while drafting the ISDA regulations.66 
And in 1978, Congress required that Indian tribes be “actively consulted” in 
 
62. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 476(b), 503 (2012); Robert J. Miller, American Indian Constitutions 
and Their Influence on the United States Constitution, 159 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHIL. 
SOC’Y 32, 45-46 (Mar. 2015); THEODORE H. HAAS, TEN YEARS OF TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 
UNDER I.R.A. 2, 30 (1947). 
63. Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, in DOCUMENTS OF 
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 256, 257 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000); FRANCIS PAUL 
PRUCHA, THE INDIANS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE 
PRESENT 72-73 (1985) (“The new watchword was ‘Indian participation.’”). 
64. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 717-21 (8th Cir. 1979). 
65. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-
458ddd-2 (2012)). In 1994, Congress enacted the Tribal Self-Governance Act as an amendment to 
the ISDA and expanded the reach of federal programs tribes could agree to operate in lieu of 
federal agencies. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 
102(18), 108 Stat. 4250, 4259, 4270 (1994); Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-
Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 
1262-66 (1995). 
66. Pub. L. No. 93-638, § 107(b), 88 Stat. 2203, 2212 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 450-458ddd-2 (2012)). 
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planning and developing educational programs for Indians and any related 
activities.67 
One of the major goals of the ISDA was to end the “Federal 
domination of Indian service programs.”68  As part of that objective, the 
ISDA allows tribal governments to agree to contracts and compacts with the 
United States to take over and operate various federal Indian programs.69 
Furthermore, Congress has also granted tribes far more power over 
economic decision making in Indian country.  For example, once tribes 
have consulted with the Secretary of the Interior and received approval of 
their regulatory schemes, tribes can make certain economic decisions 
without further federal involvement.70 
Congress has continued to support the long standing policy of 
consultation with Indian nations.  It is unnecessary, and perhaps even 
impossible as the White House admits,71 to set out the entire laundry list of 
congressional acts and administrative rules that require consultations with 
tribes and sometimes tribal consent before various actions can be 
undertaken.72  This article will thus only highlight some of the most 
significant examples. 
Congress has enacted many statutes that require consultation with 
tribes for actions that might impact Indian historic, cultural, and religious 
 
67. Pub. L. No. 95-561, §§ 1101(c), 1121-1122, 1130, 92 Stat. 2143, 2314, 2316-18, 2321 
(1978) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (2012)). See also John E. Silverman, The 
Miner’s Canary: Tribal Control of American Indian Education and the First Amendment, 19 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1019, 1025 (1992). 
68. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a) (2012). 
69. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 273 (2015). 
70. See, e.g., The Hearth Act, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2012); Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal 
Renewable Energy Development Under the HEARTH Act: An Independently Rational, but 
Collectively Deficient, Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031 (2013); Judith V. Royster, Practical 
Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-
Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065 (2008).  
71. The White House tribal consultation list of January 2009 includes this caveat: “[This list] 
does not purport to be comprehensive or all encompassing.” List of Federal Tribal Consultation 
Statutes, Orders, Regulations, Rules, Policies, Manuals, Protocols and Guidance [hereinafter List 
of Federal Tribal Consultation Statutes], http://www ncai.org/attachments/Consultation_hJYORX 
OnCSfagkpaeFLgYFNCffnFTxSpQNdqyejdardbxFCdFUz1%20fed%20consultation%20authoriti
es%202-09%20ACHP%20version6-9pdf. 
72. For an exhaustive listing of federal statutes and regulations that require tribal 
consultations, see Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of 
Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 21 n.3 
(2000). See also 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2012) (noting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
requires consultations between the Secretary of Interior, tribes, and states in certain 
circumstances); 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (amending a 1968 statutory provision, which allowed 
states to assume criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations, to require tribal consent to any 
future state assumptions). 
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issues: the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979,73 the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990,74 and the 1992 
amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act.75  And very 
recently, Congress has provided for tribal governments to consult and to 
consent on whether to opt in to new initiatives expanding their criminal 
jurisdiction.  Tribal governments that consent to exercise expanded powers 
over domestic violence and other crimes on reservations have to consult 
with federal agencies and officials, adopt various provisions, and obtain 
federal approvals before exercising this expanded jurisdiction.76 
The regulations enacted pursuant to the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act require the United States to organize and 
work with a committee composed of tribal leaders and religious leaders, to 
consult, and whenever possible, to reach agreements on how to handle the 
sensitive issues related to religious objects and graves.77  The Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation drafted the regulations for the 1992 
amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act, and the relevant 
provisions require federal officials to consult with tribes on historic and 
cultural property issues, to negotiate and reach mutual consent on 
agreements regarding these issues, and to allow tribal governments to 
participate in the resolution of any adverse effects.78 
Administrative agencies have also promulgated numerous regulations 
requiring tribal consultation and, in some situations, consent.  For example, 
 
73. Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721, 727 (1979) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470ii (2012)) 
(promulgation of regulations allowed only after tribal consultations). Also, before issuing 
excavation permits under this Act which might result in harm to religiously or culturally 
significant sites, federal officials must notify and consult with affected tribes. 16 U.S.C. § 
470cc(c) (2012); 43 C.F.R. § 7.7(a) (2015).  
74. Pub. L. No. 101-601, § 5, 104 Stat. 3048, 3052 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001-
3013 (2012)). The Act requires the drafting of regulations and several other decisions to be 
conducted only after consultations with Indian tribes and traditional religious leaders. 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 3002(b), 3002(c)(2), 3002(d), 3003(b)(1)(A), 3004(b)(1)(B), 3005(a)(3), 3006(b)(1)(A) (2012) 
(agencies to draft regulations only after consulting with the Nagpra committee comprised mostly 
of tribal representatives); see also 43 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2014). 
75. Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 4006(a), 106 Stat. 4600, 4757 (1992) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 470x-6 (2012)) (repealed by Pub. L. 113-287, §7, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3272). See 
also 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B) (requiring government-to-government consultations with tribes) 
(repealed by Pub. L. 113-287, §7, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3272). 
76. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 903, 127 Stat. 54, 
120 (2013) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 14045 (2015)); Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
211, 124 Stat. 2261 (2010).  
77. 43 C.F.R. §§ 10.1(b), 10.5(b)(3), 10.5(f), 10.8(d), 10.9(b) (2014). 
78. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2(c)(2), 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A) (2014).  Federal agencies are to engage in 
consultation and consent situations in a sensitive manner; agencies should always be aware of the 
federal trust responsibility to tribes and the government-to-government relationship and can enter 
any agreements regarding these issues.  36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(B)-(C), (E).  Agencies should 
consult with any concerned tribe, 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a), and work cooperatively to resolve adverse 
effects.  36 C.F.R. § 800.6.  
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regulations under the National Environmental Policy Act require federal 
agencies to invite affected tribes to participate in planning efforts and 
require agencies to consult with Indian tribes early in their planning 
processes.79  The Departments of the Interior and Health and Human 
Services have also promulgated rules that require them to consult and reach 
certain agreements with tribal governments.80  Other federal agencies have 
also promulgated regulations that require them to plan various actions in 
consultation and cooperation with tribes.81  In conclusion, it is clear that 
consultation with Indian nations is a legal requirement for the federal 
government in many fields of endeavor, and often tribal consent must also 
be obtained. 
D. CONSULTATION CASE LAW 
Indian nations have filed a significant number of lawsuits regarding 
what they perceive as insufficient federal consultations.  Tribal govern-
ments have prevailed in many of these cases82 and lost many others.83  In 
 
79. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2(d)(2), 1501.7(a)(1) (2014). 
80. See generally 25 C.F.R. Part 900 (2015) (negotiating ISDA contracts); 25 C.F.R. Part 
1000 (2015) (negotiating Tribal Self Governance Act compacts). See also 25 C.F.R. § 900.119 
(2014) (federal officials must consult with tribal officials); 25 C.F.R. § 1000.161 (2014) (federal 
officials must negotiate compacts with tribal officials); 25 C.F.R. §  1000.182 (2014) (tribes must 
consent to assume federal programs). 
81. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(a)(1) (2014) (National Forest System); 36 C.F.R. § 
219.4(a)(1)(3), (b) (2014) (noting the responsible official should consult on a government-to-
government basis, keep in mind the federal trust responsibility, seek native knowledge, and 
coordinate with tribes); 36 C.F.R. § 219.12 (2014) (stating the responsible office should 
collaborate and cooperatively develop goals); 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(c)(3)(iii) (2014) (monitoring of 
forest plans to be conducted jointly with federal, state, local, and tribal governments); 30 C.F.R. § 
750.6(d) (2014) (directing the BIA to consult with tribes regarding Interior’s Office of Surface 
Mining activities on Indian lands); 25 C.F.R. § 262.3(b)(1) (2015) (stating federal land managers 
must notify tribes before issuing archaeological research permits on Indian lands); 25 C.F.R. § 
900.119 (2015) (noting BIA and Indian Health Services must consult with tribes before spending 
any planning or design funding on ISDA construction projects). 
82. See, e.g., Pit River Tribe v. U. S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
federal agencies violated National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”) consultation requirements 
by not consulting with tribe over historic sites before extending geothermal leases); Muckleshoot 
Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1999) (enjoining Forest Service from 
exchanging lands with a timber company because of violating National Environmental Policy Act 
and NHPA consultation duties); Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., 2010 WL 3434091 (E.D. Wash. 2010) (holding that Department of Agriculture 
failed to consult with the nation before siting a landfill that would interfere with treaty hunting and 
fishing rights); N. Cheyenne Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 32 Indian L. Rptr. 3270, 3274-
75 (D. Mont. June 6, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (holding that BLM violated NHPA consultation 
duties and breached the agency’s trust responsibility to consult); Klamath Tribes v. United States, 
1996 WL 924509 (D. Or. Oct. 2, 1996) (holding Forest Service failed to consult regarding timber 
sales on tribal lands in violation of trust duty to avoid adversely affecting treaty resources).   
83. See, e.g., Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 
608-10 (9th Cir. 2010); Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., 545 F.3d 
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2010, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California issued 
an opinion that was a bit surprising.  In light of what looked like an exten-
sive record of federal consultations with the Quechan Tribe (“Tribe”), the 
court held that the putative consultations did not comply with the legal 
requirements.84 
In this case, the federal government was trying to fast-track a large 
solar energy development in California on 6500 acres of land managed by 
the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”).85  Under the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the project had to break ground by 
December 31, 2010, to qualify for federal stimulus funding.86 
Consequently, it appeared that BLM was actively pushing the project 
ahead.87  The relevant lands, however, were known to contain an estimated 
459 cultural resources (historic trails, burials, and archaeological sites) that 
were important to the Tribe and of historic significance, thus deserving of 
NHPA procedures.88  After becoming dissatisfied with federal consultation 
efforts, which the Tribe viewed as inadequate, lacking meaning, and 
coming after BLM had already approved the project, the Tribe filed suit for 
a preliminary injunction which the court granted on December 15, 2010.89 
The Tribe’s complaint alleged that BLM had reached a decision to 
approve the project prior to evaluating the historic and cultural resources 
under NHPA and before engaging in consultation with the Tribe as required 
by the Act.90  The BLM, however, presented the court with a lengthy list of 
what it claimed were consultations and attempts to consult with the Tribe.91 
The court then engaged in a detailed analysis (more than eight pages of the 
opinion) examining item by item each piece of evidence presented by the 
BLM to decide whether the legally required consultations had occurred.92 
Despite dozens of claimed incidents of consultation with tribes in general 
and with Tribe employees and hosting many public meetings on the project, 
 
1207, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2008); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick Sewer Auth., 334 F.3d 161 
(1st Cir. 2003). 
84. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 755 F. Supp. 
2d 1104, 1118-19, 1122 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
85. Id. at 1106-07. 
86. Id. at 1119. 
87. Id.  
88. Id. at 1107. 
89. Id. at 1108, 1122. 
90. Id. at 1106-08. 
91. Id. at 1111. 
92. Id. at 1111-20. Compare id. with Ke-Kin-is-Uqs v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests), 2008 BCSC 1505, paras. 42, 50 (Can. B.C.), where the  British Columbia Supreme Court 
considered a 1663 page “consultation record” supplied by government lawyers and decided that 
much of it was just draft meeting notes and not minutes of actual consultations, and much of it 
was specialized terminology not understandable to outsiders; the record did not “speak for itself.” 
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the court held the evidence demonstrated that “the Tribe [was] likely to 
prevail at least on its claim that it was not adequately consulted as required 
under NHPA before the project was approved.”93  The court then issued a 
preliminary injunction notwithstanding the “balance of the equities” and the 
“public interest” elements that it had to weigh before enjoining the 
construction of this important, alternative energy project.94 
It is possible that this case will be seen as an outlier because of the 
strict requirements and close scrutiny the court imposed on the BLM. 
Moreover, the district judge seemed irked by the impression created by 
BLM that it was “padding the record,” when it provided the court with 
irrelevant string citations without explanations, blurred the crucial 
chronology of the consultation process, and grouped all tribes together as 
one entity instead of just discussing its actual consultations with the 
Quechan Tribe.95 
Another case worth highlighting is a 1995 Tenth Circuit decision that 
held the U.S. Forest Service violated section 106 of the NHPA because it 
failed to properly consult with the Sandia Pueblo and to make good faith 
and reasonable efforts to identify historic resources.96  In fact, one hopes 
that this situation is an outlier because the Forest Service did not take the 
NHPA “very seriously,” ignored relevant evidence it received, seemed to 
not really want to find information that tribal sources might provide, and 
withheld very relevant information from the state historic preservation 
officer.97  Not surprisingly, the Tenth Circuit found a violation of the 
NHPA consultation requirements and ruled against the Forest Service.98 
In sum, the duty of federal consultation and consent with Indian nations 
is a very well-established legal principle in the history, statutes, admin-
istrative regulations, and caselaw of the United States.  This fact leads to 
important questions about how consultation and consent is playing out in 
modern-day U.S./Indian affairs and how the United States actions compare 
 
93. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 755 F. Supp. 
2d 1104, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
94. Id. at 1120-22. 
95. Id. at 1111-12. In comparison, in 2013 the Quechan Tribe lost a separate case about 
consultation with the BLM regarding the Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project.  Quechan Tribe 
of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U. S. Dep’t of the Interior, 927 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Cal. 
2013).  The judge in the 2013 case distinguished the 2010 case on the facts concerning BLM’s 
consultations with the Tribe.  Id. at 932-33.  In total, these two cases are valuable comparisons that 
can educate agencies on a range of methods and types of consultation efforts that do and do not 
meet legal requirements. 
96. Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 861-63 (10th Cir. 1995). 
97. Id. at 858-62.  
98. Id. at 863. 
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to international norms of consultation and consent in dealing with Indig-
enous peoples. 
III. CURRENT UNITED STATES CONSULTATION PROCEDURES: 
FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT? 
The procedures and efforts the United States currently utilizes to 
consult with Indian nations began coalescing in 1993.  In that year, 
President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12,875 entitled “Enhancing 
the Intergovernmental Partnership.”99  This Order requires executive agen-
cies to “develop an effective process” that establishes “regular and 
meaningful consultation and collaboration with State, local, and tribal 
governments on Federal matters that significantly or uniquely affect their 
communities.”100  Clinton followed that Order in 1994 with a presidential 
memorandum entitled “Government-to-Government Relations with Native 
American Tribal Governments.”101  This memo strengthened the 1993 
Order, now requiring executive branch agencies to “consult, to the greatest 
extent practicable and to the extent permitted by law, with tribal 
governments prior to taking actions that affect federally recognized tribal 
governments.”102  The head of each executive department and agency was 
charged with ensuring that the Order was communicated to and complied 
with by their respective departments.103  The Order and memorandum were 
binding, of course, on all executive branch agencies and officials. 
In 1996, Clinton continued ordering federal consultations.  In Exec-
utive Order 13,007, he directed federal agencies to accommodate native and 
tribal access to sacred sites, to create procedures to notify tribes if federal 
actions might restrict access to or adversely affect sacred sites, and to 
undertake their actions relative to sacred sites in compliance with the 
consultation procedures of his 1994 memorandum.104  The President also 
now sought to monitor agency compliance with his directives by requiring 
reports on their implementation of this Order.105 
In 1998 and 2000, President Clinton issued even stronger orders 
regarding tribal consultations.  In 1998, he required agencies “to establish 
regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration with Indian tribal 
 
99. Exec. Order No. 12,875, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 (Oct. 26, 1993). 
100. Id. at 58,903. 
101. 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (April 29, 1994).  The President also required consultations with 
tribes on issues concerning environmental justice.  Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 
(Feb. 11, 1994).   
102. 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,951. 
103. Id. at 22,953. 
104. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, 26,771 (May 24, 1996). 
105. Id.  
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governments in the development of regulatory practices on Federal matters 
that significantly or uniquely affect their communities.”106  Even in 
formulating federal policies, agencies were to be guided by principles of 
Indian self-government and sovereignty, treaty rights, and the unique legal 
relationship between tribal governments and the United States.107  Each 
agency was ordered to develop consultation procedures for tribes “to 
provide meaningful and timely input in the development of regulatory 
policies” and to avoid promulgating regulations that affect tribal 
governments unless certain conditions were met.108  When agency issues 
relate to tribal self-government, tribal trust resources, or treaty and other 
rights, agencies should “where appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for 
developing regulations.”109 
In 2000, Clinton replaced the 1998 Order with Executive Order 13,175, 
“Consultation and Cooperation with Indian Tribal Governments.”110  Order 
13,175 is still in effect today.  It includes almost all of the provisions that 
were in the 1998 Order and greatly expands on them. 
The 2000 Order was also issued “to establish regular and meaningful 
consultation and collaboration with tribal officials in the development of 
Federal policies.”111  It reaches far beyond just formal agency rulemaking, 
however, and includes tribal consultations to develop “regulations, 
legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or 
actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on 
the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on 
the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal 
Government and Indian tribes.”112  For example, agencies proposing new 
regulations that have tribal implications are required to consult with tribal 
officials “early in the process,” and they must describe in the Federal 
Register the extent of the agency’s prior consultation with tribal officials.113 
The 2000 Order also expressly directs that agencies develop “an 
accountable process,” and for the first time, imposes deadlines on the 
development of agency consultation procedures.114  In fact, agencies were 
given only thirty days after the Order became effective to designate an 
official with primary responsibility for implementing the Order, and then 
 
106. Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998). 
107. Id. at 27,655. 
108. Id.  
109. Id. at 27,656 (emphasis added). 
110. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000). 
111. Id. at 67,249. 
112. Id. See also id. at 67,250. 
113. Id. at 67,250. 
114. Id.  
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that official had only sixty days after the effective date of the Order to 
submit a description of the agency’s consultation process to the Office of 
Management and Budget (“OMB”).115  Also noteworthy, and like the 1998 
Order, the 2000 Order requires agencies, when “issues relat[e] to tribal self-
government, tribal trust resources, or Indian tribal treaty and other rights” to 
“explore and, where appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for 
developing regulations.”116  The 2000 Order increases the obligations on 
agencies in these situations by including the admonition that they should 
consider using “negotiated rulemaking” (i.e., rules developed in conjunction 
with tribal governments) to develop their regulations.117 
President George W. Bush expressly stated his support for Executive 
Order 13,175 in his 2004 presidential memorandum entitled “Government-
to-Government Relationship with Tribal Governments.”118  In 2009, 
President Barack Obama also expressly reaffirmed Executive Order 13,175 
in a presidential memorandum.119  Moreover, President Obama imposed 
new duties and deadlines on agencies. Each agency head was granted ninety 
days to submit a “detailed plan” to OMB on the actions the agency would 
take to implement Order 13,175.120  The plans themselves had to “be 
developed after consultation by the agency with Indian tribes and tribal 
officials.”121  Agency heads were also required to file progress reports with 
OMB within 270 days, and annually thereafter, on the status of each action 
included in their consultation plans.122  The President also ordered OMB to 
 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 67,251 (emphasis added). 
117. Id. See also Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561 et seq.; WILLIAM F. 
FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND 
PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 134-35 (5th ed. 2014) (describing the negotiated rulemaking 
process); Robert J. Miller & Dean Suagee, The New Indian Housing Act and Some of Its 
Environmental Implications, 13-19 (AMERICAN BAR ASS’N CONFERENCE 1997), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1247853 (explaining the author’s experience 
with the Department of Housing and Urban Development negotiated rulemaking committee which 
included forty-eight tribal representatives). 
118. Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with Tribal Governments, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Bush Memorandum], http://www2.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2013-08/documents/president-bush-2004.pdf. 
119. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Tribal 




122. Id. See also U.S. Department of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury Progress 
Report to OMB on Tribal Consultation, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-
policy/tribal-policy/Documents/2014%20Consultation%20Report.pdf; U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Action Plan for Tribal Consultation and Collaboration: Plan Submitted Pursuant to 
President Memorandum Dated November 5, 2009, http://www.usda.gov/documents/Consultation 
Plan.pdf.   
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compile a report on the implementation of Order 13,175 across the entire 
executive branch and to make recommendations, if any, for improving 
agency consultation plans and improving the tribal consultation process.123 
After all these presidential orders and memoranda, and the federal laws 
and regulations discussed in Part II.C, it is no surprise that there has been an 
enormous amount of activity in the federal government regarding tribal 
consultations and the drafting of agency consultation policies and 
procedures.  But our focus here is not to examine these myriad agency 
policies one by one but instead to determine the procedures for consultation 
that have developed from all these laws, Executive Orders, and policies.  
From these determinations, we hope to understand what is effective and 
beneficial for tribal governments and communities and if they approach the 
emerging international law regime of free, prior, and informed consent. 
A. FEDERAL CONSULTATION PROCEDURES 
A very active federal process for consulting with Indian nations has 
developed from the laws, regulations, Executive Orders, and memoranda 
already discussed.  Executive branch agencies and many independent 
federal agencies have drafted consultation policies, engaged in extensive 
consultation trainings, and subsequently engaged in myriad consultations 
with tribal governments.124  In addition, after the 2000 Clinton Executive 
Order, the OMB Director issued a memorandum directing each Executive 
Branch department to designate a specific employee to serve as a tribal 
coordinator and to be the contact point for agency compliance with the 
Order.125  In reaction, many agencies have created tribal liaison positions,126 
 
123. Obama Memorandum, supra note 119. 
124. The author has conducted numerous tribal consultation training sessions over the past 
fifteen years with federal agencies, including the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, BLM, U.S. Forest 
Service, and the Bonneville Power Administration.  
125. Jacob J. Lew, Guidance for Implementing E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination 
with Indian Tribal Governments (Jan. 11, 2001), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/memoranda/m01-07.pdf. In 2010, the OMB Director issued similar guidance. Peter R. 
Orszag, Guidance for Implementing E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian 
Tribal Governments (July 30, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
memoranda/2010/m10-33.pdf. 
126. National Congress of American Indians, Consultation with Tribal Nations: An Update 
on Implementation of Executive Order 13175, at 6-9 (Jan. 2012), http://www ncai.org/ 
attachments/Consultation_hxjBLgmqyYDiGehEwgXDsRIUKvwZZKjJOjwUnKjSQeoVaGOMvf
l_Consultation_Report_-_Jan_2012_Update.pdf. In 2013, President Obama created the White 
House Council on Native American Affairs.  Exec. Order No. 13,647, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (June 
26, 2013).  
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and all of this activity in the past two decades has led to greatly increased 
agency attention to tribal issues and thousands of tribal consultations.127 
There is no mandated federal process for how to conduct tribal 
consultations, but fairly standardized principles are being followed by most 
of the Executive Branch agencies, and best practices are well-known.  For 
example, the independent federal agency, the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation, was tasked with drafting the regulations for the 1992 
amendments to the NHPA, which added American Indian issues to historic 
preservation matters.  These regulations define consultations with tribal 
nations regarding historically significant properties as “the process of 
seeking, discussing, and considering the views of other participants, and, 
where feasible, seeking agreement with them regarding matters arising in 
the section 106 process.”128  The regulations require that consultations be 
“appropriate to the scale of the undertaking,”129 “commence early in the 
planning process,”130 and “provide[ ] the Indian tribe . . . a reasonable 
opportunity to identify its concerns about historic properties, advise on the 
identification and evaluation of historic properties . . . and participate in the 
resolution of adverse effects.”131  Obviously, these rules provide an active 
and important role for tribes in historic preservation matters.132  Other 
agencies also drafted similar rules and policies. 
We can divine a pretty clear process for tribal consultations from the 
NHPA regulations: (1) identify when agency actions might impact tribal 
interests, (2) confer with the relevant tribal nation early in the agency’s 
planning process, (3) provide tribes reasonable opportunities to identify 
their concerns about potential agency actions and to identify and evaluate 
 
127. See, e.g., National Congress of American Indians, supra note 126, at 14, 16, 20-21, 24-
25, 28-31; List of Federal Tribal Consultation Statutes, supra note 71 (providing a twelve page 
list of executive branch and military branch policies on tribal consultations); Colette Routel & 
Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
417, 436-48, 463 (2013). 
128. 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f) (2014) (emphasis added).   
129. Id. at § 800.2(a)(4).  
130. Id. at § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A). 
131. Id. (emphasis added). 
132. Agencies can enter agreements with tribes on how consultations will be carried out. 36 
C.F.R. § 800.2c(2)(ii)(E); Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Consultation with Indian 
Tribes in the Section 106 Review Process: A Handbook 25 (November 2008), http://www.achp. 
gov/regs-tribes2008.pdf.  Under the heading “Tips for Successful Consultations,” the Handbook 
advises agencies to engage in respectful communications, to consult early and often, and to 
conduct effective meetings.  Id. at 27-29.  A 2010 OMB directive even ordered agencies to 
encourage tribes to develop their own policies to achieve program objectives; where possible to 
defer to tribes to establish standards; and in determining whether to establish federal standards, to 
consult with tribal officials as to the need for federal standards or to otherwise preserve the 
prerogatives and authority of Indian tribes.  Orszag, supra note 125.  
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tribal interests, and (4) allow tribes to participate in the resolution of 
potential adverse effects.133 
The NHPA rules are not the only set of regulations that suggest specific 
federal procedures.134  Attorney General Eric Holder, for example, 
approved the Justice Department’s policy statement on tribal consultations 
in 2013.135  The Department identified four crucial procedures for 
consultations: (1) timely and adequate notice to the appropriate parties, (2) 
accessibility and convenience to tribal participants, (3) a meaningful 
process, and (4) transparency and accountability throughout the process.136 
In 1998, the Secretary of the Interior defined consultations regarding 
historic properties that would be held with any appropriate party, including 
tribes, in this fashion: 
Consultation means the process of seeking, discussing, and 
considering the view of others, and, where feasible, seeking 
agreement with them on how historic properties should be 
identified, considered, and managed.  Consultation is built upon 
the exchange of ideas, not simply providing information.137 
The U.S. Forest Service (“Service”) issues an interim directive on tribal 
consultations as part of the Forest Service Handbook.138  Forest Service line 
officers can only conduct government-to-government consultations with 
tribal leaders who have been authorized to consult on behalf of their 
tribe.139  The Service sets some time deadlines, and Service officials are 
encouraged to facilitate consultations by providing funding in some 
circumstances to tribes or tribal representatives.140  The agency defines its 
step-by-step process as: (1) contact the tribal government, preferably prior 
 
133. See Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, supra note 132, at 3, 5-8, 11, 14-16.  
134. The U.S. Department of Agriculture defines tribal consultation as “the timely, 
meaningful, and substantive dialogue between USDA officials who have delegated authority to 
consult and the official leadership of Federally recognized tribes, or their designated 
representative, pertaining to USDA policies that may have Tribal implications.”  Office of Tribal 
Relations, United States Department of Agriculture, Who We Are,  http://www.usda.gov/wps/ 
portal/usda/usdahome?navid=otr (last updated Feb. 26, 2013). 
135. Attorney General Eric Holder, Department of Justice Policy Statement on Tribal 
Consultation (August 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/otj/docs/doj-
memorandum-tibal-consultation.pdf. 
136. Id. at 5. 
137. National Park Service & Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, The Secretary of 
the Interior’s Standards and Guidelines for Federal Agency Historic Preservation Programs 
Pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act 30 (1998) [hereinafter Interior’s Standards]  
(emphasis omitted and added), http://gpmuellerdesign.com/portfolio/multimedia/itam_cd/ 
documents/Cultural%20Resource%20Documents/Standards%20and%20Guidelines.pdf. 
138. U.S. Forest Service, American Indian and Alaska Native Relations Handbook (April 1, 
2014), http://www fs fed.us/im/directives/fsh/1509.13/ (last visited June 19, 2015). 
139. Id. at 7. 
140. Id. at 8-9. 
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to scoping and public involvement, to advise the tribe of a proposed policy, 
plan, or project that may affect tribal rights; (2) allow tribes to respond; (3) 
tribes may request federal technical experts to meet with the tribes’ 
technical representatives or with the tribe; (4) issues are discussed so the 
agency understands tribal concerns; (5) consultation steps are defined and 
an agreement may be reached on the consultation process; and (6) the 
agency makes a decision in consultation with the tribe.141  These examples 
demonstrate the general outline of federal consultation procedures. 
B. BEST PRACTICES 
Much has been written about tribal/federal consultations and many 
reports and studies have been conducted on the subject.  In addition to the 
federal procedures that have developed, there are generally accepted best 
practices that should be part of any effective consultation.  Interestingly, 
having the outcome, the agency decision, be what a specific tribe desired is 
not necessarily indicative of whether a tribal nation thinks the consultation 
process was worthwhile and effective.  Just as in court proceedings, being 
fairly heard, being allowed to adequately present your argument, and 
having the decision maker seriously consider your views is an important 
best practice for successful consultations, notwithstanding the final 
decision.142 
This article will now briefly highlight some of the generally accepted 
best practices.143  It must be noted that many federal agencies have already 
incorporated some of these practices. 
 Conduct consultations on a true government-to-government, 
equal-footing basis.144 
 
141. Id. at 8. 
142. National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers, Tribal Consultation: Best 
Practices in Historic Preservation, 35, 39 (May 2005) [hereinafter NATHPO], http://www. 
nathpo.org/PDF/ Tribal Consultation.pdf.  
143. In 2006, the National Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”) proposed a very detailed 
description of best practices for the federal government to use when consulting with tribal nations. 
Proposed Minimum Requirements of a Valid Consultation Prior to Taking Federal Action, 
http://www ncai.org/attachments/ConsultationqikBfAquyWllLGSqdNYagbaMeCHbArgkPhBppx
NXdDcYhNXMPCu2%20NCAITestimony-HR5608.pdf. NCAI repeated many of these 
suggestions in a 2009 letter to the Department of Agriculture Secretary. Letter from National 
Congress of American Indians to Department of Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, (Dec. 14, 
2009), Background and Recommendations at 1-4 [hereinafter NCAI Letter], http://www ncai.org/ 
attachments/ConsultationustVpCDczCqwJLHCixLQIraeUjlUzDypiZusMhFQGeuEMPMMjRAU
SDA.pdf. 
144. NATHPO, supra note 142, at 39; National Cooperative Highway Research Program, 
Successful Practices for Effective Tribal Consultation, 124 (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter NCHRP], 
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/docs/NCHRP25-25%2879%29_FR.pdf; DARBY C. 
STAPP & MICHAEL S. BURNEY, TRIBAL CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: THE FULL CIRCLE 
TO STEWARDSHIP 122 (2002). 
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 Show respect, and listen and consider tribal comments 
carefully.145 
 Consult as early as possible in the planning process and 
provide frequent communications and multiple consulta-
tions.146 
 Provide full and candid project information and ample notice 
of consultation meetings.147 
 Conduct meetings at both agency and tribal locations, and 
conduct effective meetings to save everyone time and to 
accomplish the objectives.148 
 Provide funding for tribes to consult if at all possible.149 
 Note that confidentiality of tribal and Indian communications 
is legally allowed in certain circumstances.150 
This partial list of best practices,151 and the actual federal procedures 
discussed above, leads naturally to the question of what do Indian nations 
think of federal consultations. 
 
145. See NCHRP, supra note 144, at 124; Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, supra 
note 132, at 27; STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 122; Patricia L. Parker & Thomas F. King, 
National Park Service, NATIONAL REGISTER BULLETIN 38, Guidelines for Evaluating and 
Documenting Traditional Cultural Properties 7-8 (1998), http://www.nps.gov/history/nr/ 
publications/bulletins/pdfs/nrb38.pdf.   
146. Interior’s Standards, supra note 137, at 30; NATHPO, supra note 142, at 39; Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation, supra note 132, at 27-29; NCHRP, supra note 144, at 124. Cf. 
Parker & King, supra note 145, at 7-8; STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 122-23.  
147. Interior’s Standards, supra note 137, at 31; Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 
supra note 132, at 29-30; NATHPO, supra note 142, at 39.  
148. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, supra note 132, at 29; NATHPO, supra note 
142, at 39. 
149. NCHRP, supra note 144, at 125; STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 121 (stating that 
most tribes lack discretionary funds and cannot consult on an equal footing without funding). 
150. Interior’s Standards, supra note 137, at 31; Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 
supra note 132, at 19; 36 C.F.R. § 800.11(c)(1); see Parker & King, supra note 145, at 8.  
151. See also Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series 
C 172 (Nov. 28, 2007), para. 133 (suggesting steps for Suriname to effectively consult with the 
Saramaka: consult early in the development process and pursuant to Indigenous customs and 
traditions, accept and disseminate full information with constant communications, and conduct the 
consultation in good faith and with the objective of reaching an agreement); Jeremie Gilbert & 
Cathal Doyle, A New Dawn Over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and Consent, 
in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 315 
(Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS] (listing best 
practices as good faith; free from all external manipulations or coercion or intimidation; consult 
early in the process before approving any project activities; full disclosures of all information; 
Indigenous peoples have the right to approve or reject a project based on their community 
consensus and traditional decision making procedures; might require multiple consents spanning 
the entire project life cycle; and effective grievance mechanisms).  
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C. THE TRIBAL RESPONSE—TOO MUCH AND TOO LITTLE 
Tribal governments and communities are pleased when the United 
States respects their rights, interests, and sovereignty, and when they are 
able to participate in making decisions about projects and actions that might 
impact their interests.152  But tribal governments have many concerns about 
current federal consultation efforts and would no doubt argue that best 
practices are rarely used in federal consultations.  Ironically, federal efforts 
to date might be both “too much” and “too little.” 
The consultations might be “too much” because there are myriad 
federal agencies that are all clamoring for tribal governments to consult 
with on every subject under the sun.  Tribal governments have been 
inundated with consultation requests in recent decades.153  The presidential 
executive orders and memoranda have created a cottage industry in tribal 
consultations.  But most Indian governments do not have sufficient numbers 
of employees, government officials, and/or the funding to effectively study, 
plan, travel, and fully engage in all of these requested consultations.154 
Consequently, the National Congress of American Indians, the preeminent 
national tribal organization, suggested in 2006 that the federal government 
should distinguish between major federal actions of national importance 
that require substantial and prolonged consultations versus actions of minor 
importance.155 
More importantly, the federal consultations are also “too little” in that 
many tribes and Indians see them as almost meaningless and that tribal 
input produces so few and such minor, concrete results as to not be worth 
the time, effort, and money tribes and individual Indians are expending.156 
The lack of a consent requirement—actual consent by a tribe before federal 
agencies can proceed—is one of the main sticking points.  In addition, the 
United Nations Declaration and the newly adopted standard of free, prior, 
and informed consent have raised the bar and the expectations for Indian 
nations about consulting with the federal government. 
 
152. See NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and Recommendations at 1. 
153. Testimony of National Congress of American Indians 4 (April 9, 2008) [hereinafter 
Testimony] (stating that tribal leaders are being “consulted to death” and noting over thirty 
consultations in the past year alone), http://www ncai.org/attachments/ConsultationqikBfAquy 
WllLGSqdNYagbaMeCHbArgk PhBppxNXdDcYhNXMPCu2%20NCAITestimony-HR5608.pdf; 
NCAI Letter, supra note 143.   
154. Testimony, supra note 153, at 4. 
155. National Congress of American Indians, Resolution #SAC 06-026, 1-2, Adopted 63d 
Annual Session, Sacramento, CA (Oct. 1-6, 2006), http://www ncai.org/attachments/ 
ConsultationqikBfAquyWllLGSqdNYagbaMeCHbArgkPhBppxNXdDcYhNXMPCu2%20NCAI
Testimony-HR5608.pdf. 
156. See Testimony, supra note 153, at 1, 4; Haskew, supra note 72, at 28 (stating that 
consultations that are not enforceable “are ultimately worthless.”).  
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1. Meaningful Consultations 
Many tribal leaders do not believe they have much input regarding the 
actual decisions being made by federal agencies.157  Often agencies have 
already made a decision and/or committed funding to a project before 
consulting with tribes, and the consultation is really more an example of 
“decide and defend” or procedural hoop jumping.158  A real consultation is 
supposed to enable one party to provide input about its concerns and 
expectations to another before a decision is made and to see the information 
given and opinions expressed integrated into the decision-making process. 
Tribes complain that this rarely happens in the United States. For example, 
a Navajo Nation president described the consultations that occur at the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs Tribal Budget Advisory Council in this way: 
[T]ribal leaders come in to ask the BIA for help to protect our 
resources, our culture, our existence. . . . While the tribal leaders 
pour out their hearts talking about the needs of their people, BIA 
bureaucrats impassively listening. All the while, the BIA officials 
know that the budgetary decisions have already been made, and 
that “consultation” is nothing more than a pretense to being able to 
say that we listened and took notes . . . . Consultation in my mind 
is more than sitting there and listening; consultation is acting on 
the information.159 
The National Congress of American Indians also states that agencies 
vary in their interpretations of what constitutes meaningful consultations,160 
and that federal consultation policies are still “uneven in their application or 
adoption across entire departments.”161 
 
157. See NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and Recommendations at 1; Testimony, 
supra note 153, at 1-2; STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 122 (arguing that if tribal 
recommendations and comments are not listened to and seriously considered, then the process is 
meaningless and a waste of the tribe’s time). 
158. See NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and Recommendations at 3; Testimony, 
supra note 153, at 2 (agency already made decision); STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 144, at 119-20 
(asking does an agency truly want to know something or is it just checking the box “Have you 
consulted?”); Haskew, supra note 72, at 25.  
159. Hearing on H.R. 3490, H.R. 3522, H.R. 5608, H.R. 5680, and S. 2457 Before the H. 
Comm. on Natural Resources, 110th Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., President of 
the Navajo Nation) [hereinafter Hearing], http://naturalresources. house.gov/uploadedfiles/Shirley 
testimony04.09.08.pdf. 
160. See generally National Congress of American Indians, supra note 126. 
161. Testimony, supra note 153, at 6. Accord NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and 
Recommendations at 1-2; Hearing, supra note 159, at 1, 3-4 (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., 
President of the Navajo Nation). 
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Tribal leaders also often complain that they are not allowed to consult 
with the real decision makers.162  Tribes often request to meet with senior 
agency officials but that rarely occurs.163  In fact, in 2013 ten tribes walked 
out of an alleged consultation on the Keystone pipeline because President 
Obama was not in attendance.164  Also, in 2001 over 200 tribal 
representatives walked out of a Department of Housing and Urban 
Development meeting, which was ironically about the HUD consultation 
process, because they did not believe the consultation respected tribal 
sovereignty or was a true government-to-government consultation.165 
2. Enforceable Consultations 
The Executive Orders and memoranda expressly state that they are not 
legally enforceable and do not create any rights, benefits, or new trust 
responsibilities for Indian tribes.166  Furthermore, they can be withdrawn by 
later presidents or less vigorously enforced by later administrations.167 
Thus, some tribal leaders have advocated for a concrete method to hold the 
federal government accountable for failing to consult or for ignoring tribal 
views.  Without a means of enforceability, the only remedy available to 
tribes is to complain to the president that an executive branch agency is 
failing to consult.168  For this very reason, in 2008 H.R. 5608 was 
introduced “to establish regular and meaningful consultation and 
 
162. Testimony, supra note 153, at 4. See also Routel & Holth, supra note 127, at 458 
(noting the federal government usually sends low-ranking employees to consultation sessions).   
163. See Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 755 F. 
Supp. 2d 1104, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2010).  
164. Jacob Devaney, Sovereign Nations Walk Out of Meeting With U.S. State Department 
Unanimously Rejecting Keystone XL Pipeline, HUFFINGTON POST, May 17, 2013, 
http://www huffingtonpost.com/jacob-devaney/sovereign-nations-walk-ou_b_3289501 html; 
Chiefs Declare Keystone XL Consultation Meeting Invalid, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, May 17, 
2013, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/05/17/chiefs-declare-keystone-xl-
consultation-meeting-invalid-walk-out-state-department. 
165. Brian Stockes, Tribes Reject HUD Consultation Policy, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, 
Aug. 1, 2001, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2001/08/01/tribes-reject-hud-
consultation-policy-85005. 
166. Exec. Order No. 13,175, supra note 110, at 67,252; Bush Memorandum, supra note 
118; Obama Memorandum, supra note 119, at 57,882 (Nov. 9, 2009). One commentator states 
that “consultation rights” that “create no substantive duty on the part of the agency” shows that 
“‘consultation’ is the latest federal codeword for lip service.” Haskew, supra note 72, at 73. 
167. See Hearing, supra note 159, at 3 (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., President of the 
Navajo Nation). 
168. See NCAI Letter, supra note 143, Background and Recommendations at 2-3; 
Testimony, supra note 153, at 4; Hearing, supra note 159, at 3 (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., 
President of the Navajo Nation) (“Executive Orders and memorandums do not carry the full force 
of law. Presidents for decades have paid lip service to the idea of tribal sovereignty and self-
determination with little practical effect.”). 
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collaboration with tribal officials in the development of Federal policies.”169 
The bill defined an “accountable consultation process” and would have 
created a legal right to consultations that tribes could enforce in court.170 
The bill was referred to the House Committee on Natural Resources and a 
hearing was held, but the bill never passed the committee stage.171 
3. No Consent 
Many Indian governments are less than excited about consultations that 
do not have a tribal consent requirement.  What is the purpose of taking the 
time and effort to study an issue, develop a position, and then have the 
federal government give it only modest consideration, if even that?172 
Administration officials often realize they do not have to obtain tribal 
consent and even have downplayed President Clinton’s 2000 Executive 
Order.173 
In conclusion, it is probably correct to state that most tribal 
governments are not satisfied with the current federal consultation process, 
no matter how much it has been emphasized and possibly improved in 
recent decades.  Indian nations do not believe the federal government is 
fulfilling its trust duties towards tribes,174 nor is it giving tribes a real voice 
in decisions that vitally affect them and their lands and resources.175  Is 
there perhaps a better system for the United States to consult and work with 
American Indian nations? 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLE OF FREE, PRIOR, AND 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Indigenous nations and advocates from around the world achieved a 
great accomplishment when the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“DRIP” or 
“Declaration”) in September 2007.176  While the effort took nearly thirty 
 
169. Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments Act, H.R. 5608, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
170. Testimony, supra note 153, at 5.  
171. Id. 
172. Haskew, supra note 72, at 28 (“[C]onsultations are ultimately worthless.”). 
173. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 159, at 3-4 (statement of Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., President of 
the Navajo Nation)   
174. Routel & Holth, supra note 127, at 429-35, 474-75; Haskew, supra note 72, at 29-31. 
For a succinct discussion of the trust duty, see COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 412-16. 
175. See generally NCAI Letter, supra note 143. 
176. Julian Burger, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: From 
Advocacy to Implementation, in REFLECTIONS, supra note 151, at 42; JAMES (SA’KE’J) 
YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, INDIGENOUS DIPLOMACY AND THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE: ACHIEVING 
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years, it still seems almost miraculous that Indigenous nations, Indigenous 
peoples and organizations, and their supporters were able to push their way 
to the U.N. table, which is after all a nation/state organization, and gain 
nearly unanimous support for the DRIP.177 
Among its many provisions, the DRIP significantly strengthened the 
emerging international law principle that states must consult with 
Indigenous nations and peoples in many circumstances and must often even 
acquire their informed consent before undertaking state actions that might 
impact Indigenous peoples and their rights.178  In this section we undertake 
a detailed and original examination of the evolution of FPIC and its 
adoption in the DRIP and whether states really must obtain the consent of 
Indigenous peoples in certain situations. 
A. CREATING THE DECLARATION 
In 1972, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities (part of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights) 
appointed a Special Rapporteur to study discrimination against Indigenous 
peoples.179  Subsequently, a significant U.N. conference for Indigenous 
peoples was held in 1977 during which the delegates created a declaration 
of principles to defend the rights of Indigenous nations.180  In addition, in 
1982 the report that had been ordered in 1972 for the Sub-Commission was 
finished.181  In response to the report and the 1977 conference, the Sub-
Commission created a Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(“WGIP”) and assigned it two tasks: (1) to review the promotion and 
 
UN RECOGNITION 10-12, 24 (2008); ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED 
NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 102-05 (2007). 
177. Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations to the Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 74 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009), 
http://www.internationalfunders.org/documents/MakingtheDeclarationWork.pdf (the WGIP made 
every effort to include Indigenous peoples’ primary aspirations in the Declaration; no other U.N. 
human rights instrument has had such direct involvement of the intended beneficiaries); Luis-
Enrique Chávez, The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Breaking the Impasse: The 
Middle Ground, in id. at 97-98; Luis Alfonso de Alba, The Human Rights Council’s Adoption of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in id. at 111. 
178. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ 
Rightsover Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Human Rights System, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 263, 452, 454, 456, 461 (2010-2011); 
XANTHAKI, supra note 176, at 255, 284. 
179. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 34; Augusto Willemsen Diaz, How Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights Reached the UN, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 23. 
180. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 34; Diaz, supra note 179, at 21-22. Another significant 
meeting of Non-Governmental Organizations occurred in 1981 as well as various other meetings. 
See id.  
181. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 34. 
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protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for Indigenous 
peoples, and (2) to file a report.182  Five human rights experts from around 
the world were selected to be the WGIP.183  The WGIP, however, allowed 
Indigenous peoples and organizations to participate fully in its annual 
meetings and up to 1000 people attended these meetings, along with many 
senior government officials.184 
In 1993, after eleven years of annual working sessions, the WGIP 
experts and the Indigenous participants reached consensus on a Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.185  In 1994, the U.N. Sub-
Commission approved the text without a vote.186  Many nations/states, 
however, were unhappy with the Draft, thus the Sub-Commission requested 
a review by the U.N. Secretariat to ensure it was consistent with U.N. 
human rights standards.187  The Sub-Commission ultimately adopted the 
Draft and sent it to the Commission on Human Rights, although many states 
still resisted the Draft and lobbied the Commission not to adopt it.188 
Due to the state opposition, in 1995 the Commission took the cautious 
route and created an open-ended working group of fifty-three state 
representatives, called the Working Group on the Draft Declaration 
(“WGDD”), to review the Draft.189  Commentators claim that most states 
wanted to rewrite the entire Draft but that Indigenous peoples insisted on no 
changes at all.190  Commentators also allege that some states devoted 
significant work to revising the Draft and presented elaborate counter-
proposals to the WGDD each year.191 
 
182. Id. at 41-42, n.110; Diaz, supra note 179, at 22, 26.  The WGIP, however, was located 
at the lowest level of the UN hierarchy.  HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 41. 
183. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 42. 
184. Diaz, supra note 179, at 27; HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 47-48 (stating that at the 
first WGIP meeting fourteen Indigenous organizations attended but that by the ninth working 
session more than seventy attended with more than 2500 delegates a year attempting to 
participate). 
185. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 51; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28. 
186. Diaz, supra note 179, at 28. 
187. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 67. 
188. Id.  Indigenous representatives insisted on a policy of “no change” to the Draft.  de 
Alba, supra note 177, at 111. 
189. Mauro Barelli, Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory 
Solutions?, 13 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 413, 420 (2011) [hereinafter Barelli, Shaping Indigenous 
Self-Determination], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1991756 (last visited 
July 4, 2014). 
190. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 67, 69; Asbjorn Eide, The Indigenous Peoples, The 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples’, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 38; XANTHAKI, 
supra note 176, at 104; John B. Henriksen, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Some Key Issues and Events in the Process, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, 
supra note 177, at 79. 
191. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 70. 
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By the end of the U.N. Decade of Indigenous Peoples in 2004, 
consensus had been reached on only two of the forty-five articles in the 
Draft Declaration!192  As the idea of a second Decade of Indigenous 
Peoples was being floated in 2004, the U.N. General Assembly and the 
Secretary-General put pressure on the Commission to finish the Draft.193 
The WGDD, the state representatives, and the Indigenous representatives 
did not reach consensus on a Draft Declaration.194  Instead, in March 2006 
the Chairman of the WGDD submitted his final revised proposal for a 
Declaration to the U.N. Human Rights Council, which had replaced the 
now-defunct Commission on Human Rights.  The new Human Rights 
Council (“HRC”) adopted the Chairman’s proposal without making any 
substantive changes in June 2006 by a vote of thirty states yes, to two states 
no (Canada and the Russian Federation), with twelve states abstaining or 
absent.195 
The HRC Draft Declaration was then expected to be voted on and 
ratified by the General Assembly in fall of 2006, but the African Group of 
States (allegedly encouraged by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United States196) delayed the process.197  After further negotiations and the 
addition of nine amendments, the General Assembly adopted the 
Declaration on September 13, 2007, by a vote of 143-4 with 11 
abstentions.198  All four countries that voted no in 2007 have since stated 
their official support for the DRIP.199 
 
192. Id. at 71; Henriksen, supra note 190, at 82. 
193. de Alba, supra note 177, at 109-10; HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 72. 
194. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 74; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28.  
195. Diaz, supra note 179, at 28; Eide, supra note 190, at 39 (stating that the United States, 
New Zealand, and Australia officially protested the adoption even though they were not on the 
HRC).  
196. Barelli, Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination, supra note 189, at 423; de Alba, supra 
note 177, at 123, 128; Eide, supra note 190, at 38. 
197. Diaz, supra note 179, at 28; Eide, supra note 190, at 38. 
198. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says President, 
U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007),  http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga106 
12.doc htm (last visited July 5, 2015); Diaz, supra note 179, at 28 (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the United States voted no). 
199. Australia’s Support of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, https://www humanrights.gov.au/publications/australias-
support-declaration-rights-indigenous-peoples (last visited July 5, 2015) [hereinafter Australia’s 
Support]; Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, http://www mfat.govt nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Human-
Rights/Indigenous-Peoples/draftdec-jun07.php (last visited July 5, 2015) [hereinafter NEW 
ZEALAND]; Canada’s Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND N. DEV. CANADA (Nov. 12, 2010), 
http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142 [hereinafter Canada’s 
Statement of Support]; Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the 
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B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FPIC 
The exact phrase “free, prior and informed consent” appeared in the 
Draft Declaration for the first time after the eleventh working session of the 
WGDD in 2005–2006 in the chairman’s March 2006 revised proposal for 
the Draft.200  But the idea that Indigenous peoples have the right to consent, 
or not, prior to the commencement of state projects and programs that might 
affect is not new.  This idea seems to have appeared in international law 
circles in 1977 when Indigenous peoples, governments, and organizations 
became involved in international efforts to protect their rights. 
In 1977, the U.N. Economic and Social Council’s Sub-Committee on 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid, and Decolonization held a 
conference in Geneva on discrimination against Indigenous populations.201 
The sixty or so Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGO”), and up to 400 
people in attendance, split into groups to study specific issues and to file 
reports and recommendations. 
The Social and Cultural Commission for this conference concluded that 
Indigenous peoples in the Americas have the right to participate in the 
political lives of the countries where they live, and it protested, among other 
things, that sterilization operations were conducted on Indigenous peoples 
in the “absence of free and informed consent.”202  Moreover, the Economic 
Commission for this conference addressed the taking of Indigenous lands 
and the exploitation and damage caused to these lands from development 
projects that were conducted “without native consultation.”203  And the 
Final Resolution adopted by the conference delegates recommended that the 
lands of Indigenous peoples “should not be taken, and their land rights 
should not be terminated or extinguished without their full and informed 
 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/ 
pa/prs/ps/2010/12/153027 htm [hereinafter Announcement of U.S. Support]. 
200. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 30, 39, 46, 55-56, 61 (Mar. 22, 2006).  The Draft Declaration produced 
by the WGIP contained language very similar to FPIC.  See, e.g., id. at art. 20 (“States shall obtain 
the free and informed consent of the peoples concerned before adopting and implementing such 
measures.”).  An Indigenous representative used the FPIC phrase during the seventh work session 
of the WGDD.  Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in 
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98, at 9 
(Mar. 6, 2002). 
201. International Indian Treaty Council, The Geneva Conference (Oct. 1977) (doCip CD 
Rom) (on file with author); cf. A Documentary History of the Origin and Development of 
Indigenous Peoples Day, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES DAY, http://ipdpowwow.org/Archives1 html (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2015). 
202. International Indian Treaty Council, supra note 201, at 18. 
203. Id. at 14-15. 
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consent” and that all governments should engage in “meaningful 
negotiations” with Indigenous peoples relative to their lands.204 
The delegates also developed a Declaration of Principles, which 
included consent provisions.  The Principles stated that Indigenous treaties 
and agreements should not be subject to unilateral abrogation, no state 
should assert a claim over an Indigenous nation except pursuant to 
agreements “freely made,” and disputes should be settled by procedures 
“mutually acceptable to the parties.”205 
1. The Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the Draft 
Declaration 1982–1994 
As already noted, in 1982 the U.N. Economic and Social Council 
authorized the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities to establish a Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations (“WGIP”).206  Five independent human rights experts were 
appointed to be the WGIP.  This group was directed to review current 
developments on the rights of Indigenous peoples and to draft standards to 
promote and protect these rights.207 
The WGIP held annual sessions from 1982 to 1993. In 1982, several 
comments were received from WGIP members and Indigenous 
representatives that international and national standards concerning 
Indigenous peoples should be drafted only after consultations, that policies 
on the national recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights should not be 
formulated without consultations, and that Indigenous peoples needed to be 
consulted on their rights to participate in national development decisions.208 
Interestingly, many Indigenous and NGO representatives stated that any 
modification of Indigenous peoples’ land rights and development projects 
 
204. Id. at 22-23. 
205. Id. at 25-26. In 1981, the same U.N. Sub-Committee organized another conference on 
Indigenous peoples.  World Federation of Democratic Youth, International NGO Conference on 
Indigenous Peoples and the Land (1981).  The report of this conference reaffirmed many points 
from the 1977 conference, id. at 16, when it stated that the lands of Indigenous peoples “should 
not be terminated or extinguished without their full and informed consent.”  Id.  Some delegates 
argued that states that did not have constitutional provisions addressing Indigenous peoples should 
enact them, and Indigenous nations and peoples should determine for themselves “in negotiations 
with the governments concerned, the scope and language of the constitutional amendments.”  Id. 
at 15-16.   
206. The idea to form a working group was suggested in the Final Resolution of the 1977 
Geneva Indigenous conference on discrimination against Indigenous peoples.  See International 
Indian Treaty Council, supra note 201, at 24.   
207. Daes, supra note 177, at 48. Ms. Daes was the Chair of the WGIP during the times 
relevant to our discussion. 
208. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on 
Its First Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33, at 15-16 (Aug. 25, 1982).  
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to be operated within those lands “should be made only with the consent of 
the indigenous group concerned and only after a thorough and public 
discussion involving those populations had been held.”209  In the 1983 
session, several observers repeated that Indigenous peoples should be able 
to participate by consultation and consent in all decisions regarding 
development projects in their territories or that would have an impact on 
them.210 
Significantly, in September 1984 the WGIP chairperson, Erica-Irene 
Daes from Greece, represented the WGIP at a World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples meeting in Panama.211  At this World Council, hundreds of 
Indigenous attendees demanded that the U.N. formally recognize and 
protect their basic rights and insisted that the U.N. adopt a declaration or a 
treaty/convention to accomplish this purpose.212  Ms. Daes participated in 
extensive consultations at this 1984 conference, and these efforts led to the 
drafting of seventeen principles that she states became the basis for the 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.213  The following 
principles relevant to FPIC were developed by consensus at the Panama 
conference: 
 Indigenous peoples are entitled to participate in the political 
life of the state; 
 Indigenous peoples have exclusive rights to their traditional 
lands and resources, and if these have been taken without 
“their free and informed consent” they must be returned; 
 no actions may be undertaken which directly or indirectly 
result in the destruction of the land, air, water, sea ice, and 
other resources of Indigenous peoples “without the free and 
informed consent of the indigenous peoples affected”; and 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to be “previously consulted 
and to authorize” technological and scientific investigations 
conducted within their territories.214 
In addition, Ms. Daes reports that another “important drafting text”215 
was submitted by six Indigenous NGOs at the WGIP fourth working 
 
209. Id. at 20. 
210. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on 
Its Second Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22, at 11 (Aug. 23, 1983). 
211. Daes, supra note 177, at 49. 
212. Id. at 49, 59. 
213. Id. at 49.  
214. Id.; Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
on Its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, annex III (Aug. 27, 1985).   
215. Daes, supra note 177, at 51. 
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session in 1985.216 The Declaration of Principles presented by these NGOs 
states, in relevant part: 
 Rights to share and use lands owned by Indigenous nations or 
peoples “may be granted by their free and informed consent, as 
evidenced in a valid treaty or agreement”; 
 No state shall deny the right of Indigenous nations, 
communities, or peoples to participate in the life of the state; 
 No technological, scientific, or social investigations shall take 
place in relation to Indigenous peoples or their lands “without 
their prior authorization”; and 
 Jurisdictional disputes regarding the territories and institutions 
of Indigenous peoples “must be resolved by mutual agreement 
or valid treaty.”217 
In her opening statement in 1985 to the fourth session of the WGIP, 
Ms. Daes expressly stated that these two sets of principles should constitute 
the basis for drafting a declaration.218 
 
216. The Indian Law Resource Center, the Four Directions Council, the National Aboriginal 
and Islander Legal Service, the National Indian Youth Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 
and the International Indian Treaty Council. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, annex 
IV (Aug. 27, 1985). 
217. Daes, supra note 177, at 51-52. 
218. Id. at 53, 59; Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations on Its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, at 17 (Aug. 27, 1985).  
Other international efforts regarding Indigenous rights occurred somewhat parallel to the WGIP.  
The International Labour Organization (“ILO”) was in the process of replacing its 1957 treaty 
regarding Indigenous peoples in the mid-to-late 1980s and concluded that process in 1989.  But 
ILO convention 169 only requires states to consult with Indigenous peoples; there is no consent 
requirement.  No. 169 of 1989 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ 
normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 (last visited 
July 4, 2015).  And, it has only been ratified by 20 countries. Monitoring Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples’ Rights Through ILO Conventions, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ednorm/—normes/documents/publication/wcms 
126028.pdf.  ILO 169 was mentioned during the WGIP work sessions but was generally dismissed 
by Indigenous representatives because it did not contain consent requirements.  E.g., Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Fourth Session, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, at 16 (Aug. 27, 1985); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24, at 25 (Aug. 24, 1988); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, at 12, 
26 (Aug. 27, 1990). 
 In 1987–1991, the World Bank revised its policies regarding Indigenous peoples, but it only 
requires consultation with Indigenous peoples and not consent.  Mauro Barelli, Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Developments and Challenges Ahead, 16 INT’L J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 7-9 (2012) [hereinafter 
Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1991731.  But in 2011, the International Finance Corporation, an arm of the World Bank, 
adopted a performance standard that requires obtaining FPIC from affected Indigenous peoples 
regarding environmental and social sustainability issues. Overview of Performance Standards on 
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The principles of consultation and consent were strengthened in the 
WGIP fifth session in 1987.219  NGO observers and Indigenous 
organizations continued to press for mechanisms to require Indigenous 
consent for government actions that affected them and for a declaration that 
“free and informed consent” in many areas of Indigenous life was an 
essential element of their self-determination.220  One NGO proposed that 
the WGIP adopt this principle concerning Indigenous participation: “The 
right to be informed of any proposed actions which may affect the well 
being of any indigenous peoples or communities and to participate in all 
related decision-making processes.”221  The WGIP and the Indigenous 
participants agreed to draft a declaration, and Daes was assigned the task of 
compiling a first draft in line with the comments from the working sessions 
held to date and the principles presented by the Indigenous peoples.222 
In 1988, Daes presented the first full draft of a declaration at the 
WGIP’s sixth session.223  The draft, not surprisingly, included several 
provisions on FPIC. For example, the preamble endorsed a call for 
Indigenous “participation in and consultation about” development efforts; 
article 12 stated that “lands may only be taken away from [Indigenous 
peoples] with their free and informed consent as witnessed by a treaty or 
agreement.”224  Other articles proclaimed: (1) the Indigenous peoples’ right 
 
Environmental and Social Sustainability, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION 3 (Jan. 1, 
2012), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a79139b845faa8c6a8312a/PS7English 
2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.  See also Shalanda H. Baker, Why the IFC’s Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent Policy Does Not Matter (Yet) to Indigenous Communities Affected by 
Development Projects, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 668 (2012).   
 Furthermore, an Indigenous representative brought to the attention of the Working Group on 
the Draft Declaration an interpretation by the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racism and 
Discrimination of its standards.  This interpretation required states to obtain consent before 
making “decisions that directly impact [Indigenous peoples’] rights and interests.”  Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with Comm’n on Human 
Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/106, at 7 (Dec. 15, 1997).  
219. A 1987 study commissioned by the U.N. Sub-Committee also stated that Indigenous 
peoples should be consulted and give “explicit consent” before mining and multinational 
corporation activities occur within their territories.  José R. Martínez Cobo (Special Rapporteur of 
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities), Study of the 
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Volume 5, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/sub.2/ 
1986/7/Add.4, at 41 (1987). 
220. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on 
Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/22, at 9, 14 (1987). 
221. Id. at 17. 
222. Id. at 17; Daes, supra note 177, at 59-60, 63. 
223. Daes, supra note 177, at 63; Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations on Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24, annex II at 32-36 
(Aug. 24, 1988). 
224. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on 
Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24, annex II at 32-36 (Aug. 24, 1988); see also 
Daes, supra note 177, at 63;  
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to reclaim lands and resources “taken away from them without consent”; (2) 
a right to protection from pollution of their land, air, water, sea ice, and 
other resources caused “without free and informed consent”; (3) that states 
have a duty “to seek and obtain their consent” before exploiting mineral 
resources in Indigenous territories; (4) a right to consent to state measures 
to assist them with social and economic conditions; and (5) a right to 
participate fully in the political life of the state and “in decision-making 
about and implementation of all national and international matters that may 
affect their life and destiny.”225 
Throughout the working sessions on the draft declaration, the WGIP 
repeatedly requested comments from Indigenous peoples and organizations 
and state governments.226  The WGIP also continued to amend and expand 
the first draft at its seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth sessions in response to 
comments, including many on consultation, both pro and con, from 
governments, Indigenous peoples, organizations, and informal drafting 
committees.227  After these four years of work sessions, comments on the 
first draft, and the drafting of amendments, the WGIP presented what was 
expected to be the final draft at its eleventh session in 1993.228  After further 
long discussions, including many comments by state observers,229 the 
WGIP accepted this document by consensus and submitted it as the 
proposed Draft Declaration to the U.N. Sub-Commission.230  In 1994, the 
Sub-Commission approved it without a vote and sent it to the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights.231 
This Draft Declaration contained several provisions regarding free, 
prior, and informed consent.  There were at least five provisions that 
expressly required the “free and informed consent” of Indigenous peoples 
 
225. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on 
Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24, annex II at 32-36 (Aug. 24, 1988). 
226. Daes, supra note 177, at 64. 
227. The WGIP received many comments from governments and Indigenous peoples on 
consultation and consent.  See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations on Its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/36, at 13, 20, 23-
24, 31-33 (1989); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations on Its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, at 8, 14, 19, 24, 26 (1990); 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Ninth 
Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/40, at 10, 13, 33-34, 36 (1991); Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, at 14, 24, 28, 49 (1992). 
228. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on 
Its Eleventh Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, at 12 (1993); Daes, supra note 177, at 64. 
229. Daes, supra note 177, at 66-72. 
230. Id. at 72; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28.   
231. Daes, supra note 177, at 73; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28.   
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before states could undertake various actions,232 three other articles required 
consultations before various state actions could be commenced,233 and at 
least two provisions required agreements with Indigenous peoples.234  Once 
the Draft moved to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, many states 
began to fight it in earnest, and FPIC was one of the most controversial and 
primary targets.235 
In sum, this Draft Declaration was written by the WGIP with extensive 
input from Indigenous peoples and organizations, and, in fact, the WGIP 
actively worked to incorporate the desires and goals of Indigenous peoples 
into the document.236  States were not as actively involved in the WGIP 
 
232. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, reprinted in 
HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 164, art. 10 (allowing no forced removals of Indigenous peoples 
without their free and informed consent); id. at art. 12 (stating Indigenous peoples have the right 
to restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual properties taken “without their free 
and informed consent”); id. at 166 art. 20 (“States shall obtain the free and informed consent of 
the [indigenous] peoples” before adopting legislative or administrative measures that may affect 
them.); id. at 167 art. 27 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the[ir] lands . . . 
which have been confiscated, used or damaged without their free and informed consent. Where 
this is not possible, they have the right to just and fair compensation.”); id. at 168 art. 30 (noting 
Indigenous peoples have “the right to require that States obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories and other resources.”). 
233. Id. at 164 art. 13 (noting states shall work “in conjunction with the indigenous peoples” 
to protect cultural places); id. at 165 art. 16 (declaring states shall “in consultation with indigenous 
peoples” eliminate discrimination); id. at 169 art. 37 (noting states shall, “in consultation with the 
indigenous peoples,” adopt national legislation to give effect to the Declaration). 
234. Id. at 167 art. 28 (stating military activities cannot take place on indigenous lands 
“unless otherwise freely agreed upon”); id. at 169 art. 39 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to 
have access to and prompt decision through mutually acceptable and fair procedures for the 
resolution of conflicts . . . .”). 
235. S.J. ROMBOUTS, HAVING A SAY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 15 (2014); Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent, 
supra note 218, at 21; Henriksen, supra note 190, at 79 (stating that only three governments were 
willing to accept the Draft Declaration without changes); Luis Rodríguez-Pinero, The Inter-
American System and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Mutual 
Reinforcement, in REFLECTIONS, supra note 151, at 472 (“FPIC was one of the most controversial 
issues in the drafting process at the UN, and some of the States that abstained or voted against the 
Declaration actually voiced concern at the affirmation of FPIC understood as a ‘right to veto.’”). 
See also Comm’n on Human Rights, Consideration of a Draft United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2, at para. 14 (Oct. 10, 1995) 
(stating Argentina objected to article 20 because “the obligation to obtain the consent of the 
[indigenous] peoples” would be incompatible with the democratic principles of the Argentine 
constitution); Comm’n on Human Rights, Consideration of a Draft United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.1, at 5, 7-8 (Nov. 13,  
1995) (noting Mexico stated article 30 requiring states to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples 
before approving projects affecting their lands could violate the Mexican constitution; the United 
States said article 20 would have to be narrowed because indigenous communities could not have 
“the unqualified right to veto legislative or administrative measures affecting them.”). 
236. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on 
Its Twelfth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/30, at 28 (Aug. 17, 1994); Erica-Irene Daes, 
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Background and Appraisal, in 
REFLECTIONS, supra note 151, at 38 (“The members of the WGIP and I made every effort to 
incorporate primary indigenous peoples’ aspirations, and also took into account several 
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process, but they still offered many comments throughout the long process 
and objected to numerous provisions.237  But state resistance to the Draft 
became far more vigorous in front of the Commission on Human Rights 
after 1994, as the process of creating a declaration to go to a vote in the 
U.N. General Assembly took thirteen more years. 
2. The Working Group on the Draft Declaration 1995–2006 
State opposition to the WGIP Draft Declaration led the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights in 1995 to create an open-ended working 
group of states, entitled the Working Group on the Draft Declaration 
(“WGDD”), to review the Draft.238  Indigenous peoples had no right to 
participate in the WGDD process, although they were fully included 
anyway.239  As already mentioned, many states wanted to completely 
rewrite the WGIP Draft, but Indigenous peoples and organizations insisted 
on no changes being made.240 
The eleven year WGDD process resembled a slow motion negotiation 
and an attempt by state governments to amend the Draft when the 
Indigenous peoples and organizations adamantly refused any changes 
whatsoever.  Yet, Indigenous peoples and organizations also demanded to 
participate fully in informal state-to-state consultations and in the WGDD 
plenary debates regarding potential changes.241  The Chairman of the 
WGDD expressly recognized the difficulty of the situation, and the WGDD 
 
substantive comments and amendments proposed by various States.”); Barelli, Shaping 
Indigenous Self-Determination, supra note 189, at 418, 420; Diaz, supra note 179, at 28 (declaring 
that Indigenous peoples were full participants and drafters); Julian Burger, The United Nations 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 209, 210 (1996) 
(asserting that essentially it is the outcome of a “partnership between experts and indigenous 
peoples.”). 
237. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations on Its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, at 25 (Aug. 27, 1990); 
Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent, supra note 218, at 19; XANTHAKI, supra note 176, at 
102 (“States gradually withdrew from the drafting process, attending in small numbers and often 
reluctant to engage in a dialogue on the provisions.”). 
238. Barelli, Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination, supra note 189, at 418, 420 (claiming 
that states chose not to actively participate in the WGIP so most of the work was performed by the 
five experts and Indigenous peoples). 
239. Diaz, supra note 179, at 28. 
240. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 67, 69; Chávez, supra note 177, at 97, 99-101. In 2000, 
the Russian representative stated: “the current text of the draft declaration was not acceptable to 
most Governments.” Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in 
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/85, at 8 
(Feb. 6, 2001). 
241. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in 
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/84, at 4 
(Dec. 6, 1999); Chávez, supra note 177, at 101. 
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seems to have slowly massaged the annual meetings and pressured the 
states and Indigenous peoples to accept some changes.242 
Throughout the eleven years of the WGDD process, states also resisted 
the consent provisions in the Draft.  In fact, starting at the very first work 
session in 1995, several governments stated they could not accept the FPIC 
provisions because they created a separate political, legal, and social system 
for Indigenous peoples that would discriminate against others, and some 
governments objected to the very term “consent.”243  In the second work 
session in 1996, many governments began suggesting changes that would 
have dramatically limited FPIC. Brazil, for example, suggested that the 
FPIC provision in article 20 should be amended to state that “Indigenous 
people have the right to participate fully, if they so choose . . . . [and their] 
informed opinion shall be expressed freely.”244  Brazil also suggested 
changes to articles 27, 28, and 30; although Indigenous peoples should be 
active and informed participants in political affairs, Brazil felt states should 
only have to “take account of their free and informed opinion in the 
approval of any project affecting their lands and their resources.”245 
France also opposed these articles because they impacted state 
sovereignty and “gave indigenous peoples a right of veto.”246  Other 
countries also thought that the FPIC in proposed article 20 gave 
“indigenous peoples a right of veto.”247  Even as late as the seventh work 
session, the WGDD Chairman summed up the debate on proposed article 
10 (forced removals) and said that questions about the meaning of 
“consent” remained, and states continued to suggest alternative words such 
as “consultation” or “agreement.”248 
 
242. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in 
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh 
Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 4-5 (Mar. 22, 2006).   
243. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84, at 
15 (Jan. 4, 1996). 
244. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/102, at 37 (Dec. 10, 
1996). Accord id. at 34-36, 46 (stating Canada suggested, and Japan agreed, that articles 19 and 20 
be merged and only reflect the principle that Indigenous peoples have “the right to participate 
fully in public affairs”; Malaysia also wanted to limit article 20). 
245. Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
246. Id. at 36. 
247. Id. at 39; See also Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established 
in Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/84, 
at para. 93 (Dec. 6, 1999) (noting the New Zealand representative recognized Indigenous peoples 
rights but said they must be balanced by the need of governments to own or regulate resources for 
all citizens).   
248. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98, at para. 82, annex I 
         
80 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:37 
Several of the FPIC provisions, however, were far less controversial 
and many states agreed, for example, that hazardous materials should not be 
stored on Indigenous lands and that Indigenous lands should only be taken 
“with the free and informed consent of indigenous peoples.”249  And many 
states expressed support for FPIC at different times in somewhat limited 
fashions.250 
Very little progress towards agreement on the exact language of the 
Draft was reached in these work sessions, and mostly informal debates and 
side consultations occurred.  In fact, by the ninth session in 2004, only two 
of the forty-five articles in the Draft had been accepted by consensus.251 
Consequently, France called on WGDD Chairman Luis-Enrique Chávez to 
compile language for the Draft that might be approved by consensus.252 
This was itself very controversial because Indigenous representatives were 
demanding that no changes be made to the WGIP Draft.253 
Mr. Chávez then created what appears to be his first summary of the 
proposals suggested to amend and to add new language to the Draft.  He 
circulated this summary as an annex to his report on the ninth session.254 
Pursuant to the proposed changes, he added one new provision of free and 
informed consent that was not in the WGIP Draft.255  He of course also 
reported the objections of most governments to many of the “free and 
informed consent” provisions and their proposals for amendments.256  He 
even suggested alternative language to FPIC in regards to forced removals 
of Indigenous peoples.257  And for article 20 (now 19 in the DRIP), he 
reported a proposal to merge Draft articles 19 and 20, which also removed 
 
at 24 (Mar. 6, 2002). See also Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established 
in Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92, 
annex at 21-22 (Jan. 6, 2003) (noting that Australia suggested amending article 30 to delete 
consent entirely and only require state consultations). 
249. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92, at para. 37, annex at 
23-25 (Jan. 6, 2003) (quoting New Zealand representatives). 
250. See id. at paras. 44-46 (showing that in discussing article 30, Canada’s representative 
said that “prior informed consent might not be required in all cases”). 
251. Henriksen, supra note 190, at 82; HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 71. 
252. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/81, at para. 19 (Jan. 7, 
2004). 
253. MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 97, 99, 101.  
254. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/81, annex at 20 (Jan. 7, 
2004). 
255. Id. annex at 25. 
256. See, e.g., id. annex at 24. 
257. Id. annex at 22. 
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the FPIC provision.258  In addition, he reported a proposal to change the 
language in article 30 of the Draft from states having a duty to obtain free 
and informed consent prior to approving development projects affecting 
Indigenous lands to a duty that states only had to “seek their free and 
informed consent prior to the approval” of any such project.259  He also 
summarized a proposal that would have significantly limited the duty of 
states having to obtain consent by merging articles 25–28 and 30 of the 
WGIP Draft that addressed several different issues regarding Indigenous 
lands and rights, such as the exploitation of minerals and the military use of 
their lands.260  These state suggestions would have eviscerated the 
application of FPIC. 
Before the start of the tenth session, several states demonstrated their 
support for limiting FPIC.  Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, 
Finland, Iceland, and Sweden filed their edited version of the WGIP 
Draft.261  They left in many of the free and informed consent provisions, but 
they changed the verb “obtain” into “seek” in articles 20 and 30 (now 19 
and 32(2) in the DRIP).262  In another document, submitted on the same 
date, these states explained in regards to FPIC that they were trying to 
affirm the principle of consent “as far as possible.”263 
The tenth session was a split session, and the first part was held 
September 13–24, 2004.264  During the break between sessions, on October 
14, 2004, the Chairperson filed his second summary of proposals.265  He 
again accurately reported the state suggestions to use the word “seek” 
instead of “obtain” regarding Indigenous consent in articles 20 and 30, and 
to possibly remove FPIC from article 10 on forced removals.266  Also 
during the session break, the Indigenous peoples of Scandinavia, the 
Saamis, put forward their written proposal for the Draft in which they 
 
258. Id. annex at 24. 
259. Id. annex at 26 (emphasis added). 
260. Id. annex at 26-27. 
261. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with Comm’n 
on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Information Provided by States, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.1 (Sept. 6, 2004). 
262. Id. at 9, 11. 
263. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with Comm’n 
on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Information Provided by States, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.2, at 6-7 (Sept. 6, 2004). 
264. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/89, at 5-6 (Feb. 28, 2005).   
265. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Chairperson’s Summary of Proposals, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.4, at 1 (Oct. 14, 2004). 
266. Id. at 17, 28-29, 37-38. 
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accepted the use of “seek” over “obtain” in article 20 but rejected “seek” in 
article 30 (article 32(2) of the Declaration) because they argued that states 
must get FPIC before taking or using the lands and territories of Indigenous 
peoples.267 
The tenth session was then completed from November 29 to December 
3, 2004.268  The Indigenous representatives objected vociferously to the 
Chairman’s summary of proposals including the changes suggested to FPIC 
and the use of “seek” instead of “obtain” in article 30.269  Indigenous 
peoples insisted on the return of FPIC language and some even staged a 
hunger strike and engaged in other protest efforts because of the proposed 
changes.270  In a list of the most important issues compiled by Indigenous 
peoples regarding the Chairman’s summary, they stated: “The principles of 
prior informed consent and full collaboration with affected indigenous 
peoples must be applied for the effective implementation by States of the 
provisions throughout the declaration.”271  Obviously no consensus could 
be reached on the proposed changes to the WGIP Draft after lessening state 
consent obligations.272  Throughout the tenth work session, a facilitator was 
used to conduct discussions.  The facilitator strongly suggested that the 
Chairman delete “seek” from articles 20 and 30 and return to “the verb 
obtain.”273 
Also during the tenth session, the Chair stated that for the first time he 
would submit a Chairman’s proposal for the entire Draft Declaration, not 
 
267. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Information Provided by the Saami Council 
and the Tebtebba Foundation, Endorsed by the Saami Parliamentarian Council, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.5, at 12, 15 (Oct. 28, 2004). 
268.  Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance with Comm’n 
on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Chairperson’s Summary of Proposals, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.4, at 1 (Oct. 14, 2004). 
269. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/89, at para. 35 (Feb. 28, 2005). 
270. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 199/32 of 3 March 1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/ 
89/Add.1, at 4-5, 8 (Feb. 24, 2005) (displaying written comments submitted by Indigenous 
organizations after end of the tenth session). See also Adelfo Regino Montes & Gustavo Torres 
Cisneros, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Foundation 
of a New Relationship Between Indigenous Peoples, States and Societies, in MAKING THE 
DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 143. 
271. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 199/32 of 3 March 1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/89/ 
Add.1, at 8 (Feb. 24, 2005). 
272. Comm. on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/89, 
at 7 (Feb. 28, 2005). 
273. Id. at 7. 
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just a summary of the proposals of the states and Indigenous 
representatives.274  Chairman Chávez released his proposal on April 1, 
2005.275  In the two most controversial FPIC articles, he used the verb 
“obtain” regarding consent in article 30, but for article 20, which concerned 
states obtaining FPIC before enacting legislative and administrative 
measures that may affect Indigenous peoples, he only required states to 
“seek” their consent and did not require states to “obtain” consent.276 
During this ten year process from 1995–2005, the United Nations 
Decade of Indigenous Peoples had come to an end and the continued 
existence of the WGDD was in question.277  In fact, the WGDD was 
ultimately authorized to work only one more year on the Draft 
Declaration.278  Thus, the WGDD met for its final time in its eleventh 
session from December 5–16, 2005, and January 30 to February 3, 2006, to 
discuss the Chairman’s April 2005 proposal for the Draft.279 
From the very opening of the session, Chairman Chávez put pressure 
on the state and Indigenous representatives.280  He emphasized that this was 
the last meeting of the WGDD and thus the participants had to be flexible 
and conciliatory because they had to make clear progress towards creating a 
text that could be adopted by consensus.281  He also wanted the text to be as 
close as possible to the WGIP Draft, but it also had to include the proposed 
amendments that seemed necessary.282  Not surprisingly, at the end of the 
eleventh session, consensus was not reached on the Draft.283  Consequently, 
the Chair stated he would revise the proposals he presented after the tenth 
session, include all the language provided by the eleventh session 
facilitators, and make his own proposals regarding the articles still pending 
based on the session discussions.284 
 
274. Id. 
275. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/89/Add.2, at 1 (Apr. 1, 2005). 
276. Id. at 28, 41. See also id. at 17 (noting the Chair proposed that FPIC was required in 
article 10 for forced removals). 
277. See Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance 
with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 4 (Mar. 22, 2006). 
278. Montes & Cisneros, supra note 270, at 143. 
279. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 4 (Mar. 22, 2006). 
280. Id. at 4.  
281. Id. at 4-5. 
282. See id. at 5. 
283. Id. at 7.  
284. Id. 
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Both Indigenous and state representatives were very concerned about 
the lack of consensus on many articles.285  The Chair responded that he 
would present the “revised Chairman’s proposals” to the U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights “with the hope that it would be considered as a final 
compromise text.”286  He completed his revised proposal quickly and 
submitted it on March 22, 2006, along with his final report on the eleventh 
session.287  The Chair’s proposal was adopted without any substantive 
changes by the U.N. Human Rights Council in June 2006.288 
Since the Chair’s revised proposal was adopted as the HRC Draft 
Declaration, it is especially useful in regards to FPIC to compare his 
proposal with the Draft of the WGIP.  First, the Chairman retained most if 
not all of the FPIC provisions from the WGIP Draft, and in fact he even 
added two new FPIC requirements and numerous other provisions requiring 
states to consult, cooperate, enter agreements, or act in conjunction with 
Indigenous peoples.289  He also used in his proposal, apparently for the first 
time used by anyone in written form, the exact phrase “free, prior and 
informed consent.”290 
Second, he also retained FPIC in the most controversial articles, 20 and 
30 (now 19 and 32(2) of the Declaration).291  He ignored the state proposals 
to use the conditional word “seek” instead of the mandatory word to 
“obtain” FPIC.292  However, the Chair did make some unilateral and very 
significant changes to these two articles that perhaps served state 
interests.293  In articles 20 and 30, which require states to “obtain” the free 
and informed consent of Indigenous peoples before enacting legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them, and before approving 
development projects affecting their lands and territories, the Chair added 
 
285. Id. 
286. Id.; Chávez, supra note 177, at 102.  The Chair’s hopes were realized because his 
proposal was accepted without any substantive changes as the Draft Declaration by the Human 
Rights Council, which had replaced the Commission on Human Rights. 
287. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 8-77 (Mar. 22, 2006). 
288. See Chávez, supra note 177, at 105.   
289. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in 
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh 
Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 39 (Mar. 22, 2006) (article 12); id. at 42 (article 15 in 
which the Chair added “in conjunction with”); id. at 43 (article 16 in which the Chair added 
“consultation and cooperation”); id. at 48-49 (article 22); id. at 53 (article 26); id. at 56 (article 28 
in which the Chair added FPIC); see also id. at 40, 59, 67, 70. 
290. See, e.g., id. at 30 (article 10); id. at 46 (article 20); id. at 61 (article 30). 
291. Id. at 40, 61. 
292. Id. at 46. 
293. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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this identical wording in both articles: “States shall consult and cooperate in 
good faith with the indigenous peoples . . . in order to obtain their” FPIC.294 
Chairman Chávez interprets this language as only requiring states to use a 
mandatory procedure—consultation and cooperation in an attempt to obtain 
consent— but not as a requirement to actually obtain consent.295 
3. The Draft Declaration in the Human Rights Council and 
General Assembly 2006–07 
In 2006, the Commission on Human Rights was abolished and a new 
entity, the U.N. Human Rights Council, was created.296  During its very 
first session, on June 29, 2006, the Council adopted without any substantive 
changes Chairman Chávez’s March 22, 2006, revised proposal as the Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.297  The HRC Draft was 
not adopted by consensus, but the state representatives on the HRC voted 
for Mr. Chávez’s proposal thirty yes, two no (Canada and the Russian 
Federation), with twelve abstentions.298 
With this vote, it appeared a foregone conclusion that the U.N. General 
Assembly would also adopt the Draft in fall of 2006.  However, the few 
states actively opposing the Draft continued to fight, and apparently they 
enlisted the African Group of nations to help put a stop to a General 
Assembly vote in 2006.299  Primarily led by Namibia, the African Group 
had seven objections to the Draft, including that FPIC might give 
Indigenous peoples a veto power over state actions.300  The African nations 
ultimately offered more than thirty-five amendments to the HRC Draft 
 
294. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on Its Eleventh Session, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, at 46 (Mar. 22, 2006) (article 20); id at 61 (article 30).  
295. See infra text accompanying notes 331-37. 
296. de Alba, supra note 177, at 108, 117. The creation of the Council elevated human rights 
issues in the United Nations hierarchy because the HRC reports directly to the General Assembly. 
Id. at 108, 117. 
297. de Alba, supra note 177, at 108-09, 121-124. See also Human Rights Council 
Resolution 2006/2, (June 29, 2006), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration 
.aspx. 
298. de Alba, supra note 177, at 108.  The HRC has a limited number of representatives that 
serve set terms. Of the states with representatives on the Council in 2006, only Canada and the 
Russian Federation voted no.  Id.  Canada filed a statement explaining its no vote and cited the 
FPIC provisions in particular.  Ambassador Paul Meyer, Statement to the First Session of the 
Human Rights Council (June 29, 2006), http://www.docip.org/greenstone/collect/cendocdo/index/ 
assoc/HASH1009/f057ac98.dir/5.Canada. 
299. See de Alba, supra note 177, at 122-23, 125. As already mentioned, many scholars 
report that the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand actively encouraged African 
nations to object. Id. at 122-23; see also supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
300. Albert K. Barume, Responding to the Concerns of the African States, in MAKING THE 
DECLARATION WORK, supra note 177, at 170-72; see de Alba, supra note 177, at 126-27. 
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between April and May of 2007, but these changes were refused by 
Indigenous peoples and organizations and by the states that supported the 
HRC Draft.301  Also, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States filed 
joint objections that the Draft process had been deeply flawed, was 
finalized without agreement or consensus, provided for possible secession 
by Indigenous peoples and nations, and created different categories of 
citizens due to the FPIC provisions.302  These arguments were identical to 
those being made by the African Group of nations.303 
Thereafter, the President of the U.N. General Assembly appointed the 
Philippine U.N. representative to negotiate this impasse, and after intense 
negotiations and lobbying, the African objectors, the state sponsors of the 
HRC Draft, and Indigenous representatives accepted nine amendments to 
the Draft, none of which concerned the FPIC provisions.304  The U.N. 
General Assembly then voted to adopt the HRC Draft as the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on September 13, 2007, 
the last day of the United Nation’s 61st session.305  The only four countries 
to vote no, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, 
explained their reasons, which included the FPIC provision in article 19 
(article 20 in the Draft).306  As already mentioned, however, all four of 
these countries have since officially endorsed the Declaration.307 
 
301. Barume, supra note 300, at 172; de Alba, supra note 177, at 127-29.  
302. de Alba, supra note 177, at 129 n.37.  As late as August 13, 2007, Canada, Colombia, 
New Zealand, and the Russian Federation sent the U.N. General Assembly President thirty-four 
proposed amendments, including to some of the FPIC provisions.  Id. at 131.   
303. de Alba, supra note 177, at 129 n.37. 
304. Barume, supra note 300, at 178-79; Montes & Cisneros, supra note 270, at 150-51; de 
Alba, supra note 177, at 108, 129-32. 
305. Montes & Cisneros, supra note 270, at 151. See also de Alba, supra note 177, at 108, 
132 (noting that the DRIP was adopted by a vote of the U.N. General Assembly, 143 – 4, with 11 
abstentions).   
306. United States Press Release # 204, September 13, 2007 (the U.S. objected that the HRC 
Draft had not been before the WGDD but was prepared and submitted after the last working 
session concluded, states had had no opportunity to discuss it, the HRC allegedly did not respond 
to U.S. calls to work on a consensus text, and because of the splintered vote (30-2)).  The 
following four documents are available at http://www.docip.org/Online-Documentation.32.0.html 
(last visited July 27, 2015): Observations of the U.S. with Respect to the Declaration, at 2 (naming 
specifically Article 19 as possibly conferring a veto power over domestic laws to a sub-national 
group); Explanation of Vote by the Hon. Robert Hill Ambassador and Permanent Representative 
of Australia, at 3 (“Australia has concerns that the Declaration expands any right to free, prior and 
informed consent too far.”); Statement by Ambassador John McNee Permanent Representative of 
Canada, at 3 (stating that the FPIC provisions “are unduly restrictive” and Article 19 might 
prevent states from enacting legislative or administrative matters); Explanation of Vote by New 
Zealand Permanent Representative H E Ms. Rosemary Banks, at 2 (“[F]our provisions in the 
Declaration are fundamentally incompatible with New Zealand’s constitutional and legal 
arrangements . . . articles 19 and 32 on a right of veto over the State.”). Accord U.N. GAOR, 61st 
Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13 2007) (Australia voted no because 
of FPIC and an Indigenous veto); id. at 12-13 (Canada voted no because of FPIC, Article 19, and 
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C. WHEN DOES THE DECLARATION REALLY REQUIRE PRIOR 
CONSENT? 
The U.N. Declaration contains many provisions that require states in 
certain situations to enter agreements with Indigenous peoples,308 to engage 
in consultations and to cooperate with Indigenous peoples,309 to work in 
conjunction and cooperation with Indigenous peoples,310 and to obtain the 
free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous peoples.311  Most of these 
provisions are not controversial, at least not in the United States where 
Indian nations have government-to-government political relationships with 
the United States, the U.S. owes them a fiduciary trust duty, and tribes and 
Indians own their lands and other property rights as recognized in treaties, 
 
an Indigenous veto); id. at 14 (New Zealand voted no because of FPIC, Article 19, and an 
Indigenous veto).  
307. Australia’s Support, supra note 199; NEW ZEALAND, supra note 199; Canada’s 
Statement of Support, supra note 199; Announcement of U.S. Support, supra note 199. See also 
DWIGHT G. NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 150 (2014) 
(stating that each endorsement came with an interpretive statement to limit the legal effects of the 
endorsement; Canada, for example, said that the DRIP is only aspirational, not legally binding, 
and does not reflect customary international law).   
308. HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 154 art. 18 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to 
participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights . . . .”); id. at 155 art. 23 
(“Indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, 
housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them . . . .”); id. at 156 art. 30(1) 
(stating no military activities can occur in Indigenous peoples’ lands or territories unless freely 
agreed upon). 
309. Id. at 154 art. 17(2) (“States shall in consultation and co-operation with indigenous 
peoples take specific measures to protect indigenous children from economic exploitation . . . .”); 
id at 156 art. 30(2) (noting states shall consult with Indigenous peoples “prior to using their lands 
or territories for military activities”); id. at 157 art. 36(2) (“States, in consultation and co-operation 
with indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and 
implementation of” Indigenous peoples’ rights to maintaining contact and activities across 
international borders.); id. at 158 art. 38 (“States, in consultation and co-operation with indigenous 
peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of 
this Declaration.”). 
310. Id. at 153 art. 12 (declaring that states shall develop effective mechanisms in 
conjunction with Indigenous peoples for their access to, and repatriation of, ceremonial objects 
and human remains); id. at art. 14(3) (“States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take 
effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children . . . to have access, 
when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language.”); id. at 
art. 15(2) (“States shall take effective measures, in consultation and co-operation with the 
indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination . . . .”); id. at 155 
art. 22(2) (“States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that 
indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of 
violence and discrimination.”); id. at 156 art. 27 (“States shall establish and implement, in 
conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and 
transparent  process . . . to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to 
their lands, territories, and resources . . . .”); id. at 157 art. 31(2) (“In conjunction with indigenous 
peoples, States shall take effective measures to recognize and protect” Indigenous peoples’ 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, sciences, technology, and cultures.). 
311. Id. at 152-54, 156-57 arts. 10, 11(2), 19, 28(1), 29(2), 32(2). 
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federal statutes, and/or court orders.312  During the WGDD process, many 
states noted that when Indigenous peoples own land and property rights, 
they often should have the right to consent, or not, to state actions that 
might harm or affect those rights.313  In this section, we will focus on the 
six FPIC provisions that purport to require states to secure the free, prior, 
and informed consent of Indigenous peoples in certain situations. 
As a preliminary matter, however, we must note that the DRIP is not 
yet considered binding international law.  The United States, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia all made that point abundantly clear when they 
issued their statements of support for the Declaration after initially voting 
against it in 2007.314  The DRIP is a U.N. General Assembly resolution and 
is not the equivalent of treaties and U.N. conventions that states ratify and 
agree to abide by.315  Thus, the Declaration is not a legally binding 
document but, as some say, it is only aspirational.316  But another way to 
view the DRIP is that it represents what was already accepted international 
law regarding Indigenous nations and peoples.  The fact that the U.N. voted 
143-4 in favor of the DRIP is some evidence, maybe even persuasive 
evidence, that nation/states viewed the Indigenous rights and state duties 
explicated in the Declaration to already be established international law. 
That possibility is very significant under what can be called the 
common law of international law, opinio juris.  Under opinio juris, when 
states act in a certain fashion because they think it is required of them under 
international law, they are in effect creating and solidifying international 
law because they are acting according to standards that they think are 
 
312. See, e.g., COHEN’s, supra note 31, at 412-16, 993-1318; Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 
234, 242-43 (1997) (holding the federal government cannot take individual Indians’ property 
without paying compensation); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 236-37 (1983) (holding 
that an individual Indian can sue the U.S. for money damages for breach of trust in managing her 
timber); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 
707 (1979) (declaring signatory tribes own treaty-recognized property rights in salmon); Arizona 
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 644-45 (1963) (holding that five tribes own an enormous quantity of 
Colorado River water); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968) 
(noting the tribe retained property rights for hunting based in treaty, even though terminated from 
federal recognition); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (U.S. trust 
responsibility). 
313. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group Established in 
Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92, at 10-11, 
23-25, (Jan. 6, 2003) (citing the New Zealand, Canadian, and Norwegian representatives). 
314. See supra notes 199, 307, and accompanying text. 
315. NEWMAN, supra note 307, at 149 (General Assembly resolutions do not have inherent 
legal force). 
316. Id. at 150; Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous 
Peoples’ Participation Rights Within International Law, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS 54, para. 12 
(2011).  
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legally required of them.317  Some commentators argue that in 2007 the 
DRIP represented established international law requirements,318 including 
the U.N. Special Rapporteur James Anaya,319 and thus perhaps it is itself 
binding international law pursuant to opinio juris.  With those thoughts in 
mind, let us turn to the six FPIC provisions. 
First, article 10 forbids the forcible relocation of Indigenous peoples 
from their lands or territories without their consent and mandates that 
removals can only occur after agreements are reached on fair 
compensation.320  There seems to be nothing controversial about that point 
although there were proposals in the WGDD to drop the FPIC provision in 
regards to removals.321  But in 2007, forced removals of peoples were 
already considered illegal under international law and might even be 
defined as genocide under a 1948 United Nations convention.322  Moreover, 
 
317. See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 307, at 144-45, 153 (noting “the obligation to consult . . 
. is also a general principle of international law” and Canada now has a duty to consult with 
Indigenous peoples as part of developing international law).  A U.N. General Assembly resolution 
can describe customary international law.  Id. at 149.  But see Ward, supra note 316, at para. 86 
(noting FPIC is not customary international law yet, but a customary minimal norm of 
consultation with Indigenous peoples has crystallized). 
318. See, e.g., Montes & Cisneros, supra note 270, at 155 (arguing that the DRIP did not 
necessarily create new rights, but instead just repeated and re-affirmed already existing rights, 
which had already become recognized in international law); ROMBOUTS, supra note 235, at 88 
(arguing that the U.N. had already approved FPIC in 2005 when it stated its objectives for a 
second decade of the world’s Indigenous peoples: “To promote the full and effective participation 
of indigenous peoples in decisions which directly or indirectly affect their lifestyles, traditional 
lands and territories, their cultural integrity as indigenous peoples with collective rights, or any 
other aspects of their lives, considering the principle of free, prior and informed consent.” 
(quoting U.N. GA, Draft Programme of Action for the Second International Decade of the 
World’s Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. A/60/270, at 4 (Aug. 18, 2005)); Stefania Errico, The 
Controversial Issue of Natural Resources: Balancing States’ Sovereignty with Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights, in REFLECTIONS, supra note 151, at 357-58 (quoting the World Bank’s legal 
department as saying that consultation with, and the participation of, Indigenous peoples in 
decisions affecting them is an “emerging principles of international law” (citing Legal Note on 
Indigenous Peoples, para. 28 Apr. 8, 2005, www.worldbank.org/indigenous (last visited July 7, 
2015))). 
319. James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/12/34, at 12 (July 15, 2009) (“[T]he duty of States to consult with indigenous peoples . . . 
is firmly rooted in international human rights law.”). 
320. G.A. Res. 61/295 (X) (Sept. 13, 2007). 
321. See supra notes 248, 257, 266, and accompanying text. 
322. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 3 (1948), 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf; 
Office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 1, http://www.un.org/en/prevent 
genocide/adviser/pdf/osapganalysisframework.pdf.  One group says that removals can meet the 
U.N. definition of genocide if a removal imposes conditions of life on an ethnic or racial group 
with the intent to destroy them in whole or in part.  The Legal Definition of Genocide, PREVENT 
GENOCIDE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/officialtext-printerfriendly 
htm (last visited August 10, 2015).  
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this same idea has been reflected in United States law since colonial times 
and was expressly stated in the Removal Act of 1830.323  Furthermore, 
article 28(1) provides a right of redress for Indigenous peoples, which can 
include restitution of lands or monetary relief, for any of their lands, 
territories, or resources that are taken, occupied, or damaged without their 
free, prior and informed consent.324  And, unless Indigenous peoples “freely 
agree[]” otherwise, compensation must include providing other lands of 
comparable value.325  This provision also seems to match United States law 
regarding American Indian nations.326 
In addition, article 11(2) requires states to provide redress through 
mechanisms developed “in conjunction” with Indigenous peoples regarding 
any of their cultural, intellectual, religious, or spiritual property rights that 
have been taken without FPIC.  United States law already protects many of 
these same issues for American Indians and tribes.327 
Furthermore, article 29(2) prohibits the storage or disposal of 
hazardous waste on the lands or territories of Indigenous peoples without 
their free, prior, and informed consent.328  This provision does not seem 
surprising if Indigenous peoples own the lands at issue.  In the United 
States, however, despite this seemingly obvious tenet, and despite U.S. 
obligations to Indian nations, the federal government has been fairly 
accused of using Indian lands as “national sacrifice areas” over the past two 
centuries to the extreme detriment of tribes and Indian communities.329 
The controlling factor under these four FPIC provisions seems to be 
that if Indigenous nations or peoples own specific lands, rights, or 
 
323. See Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830); see supra text accompanying note 52.  
Removals of American Indians were mostly performed pursuant to alleged consent demonstrated 
in subsequent treaties. Cf. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 145, 162 (Treaty with the 
Wyandot, Etc., 1817, art. 6, 7 Stat. 160 and Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., 1818, art. 1, 7 Stat. 
178).  
324. G.A. Res. 61/295, Art. 28(1) (Sept. 13, 2007). 
325. Id. 
326. See, e.g., supra note 312; PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 1017-23 
(describing the Indian Claims Commission process created by Congress to compensate tribes for 
lands illegally taken); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 423-24 (1980).  
327. See, e.g., Robert J. Miller, American Indian and Tribal Intellectual Property Rights, 13 
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 179, 179 (2010); PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER, supra note 26, at 932-
34, 973-76 (discussing the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1934); see Exec. Order No. 13,007, supra 
note 104 (sacred sites); 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq. (Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act of 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (American Indian Religious Freedom Act); 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2901 (Native American Language Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (protecting Indian religious use of 
peyote); COHEN’s, supra note 31, at 1265-318 (discussing a wide range of Indian rights).   
328. G.A. Res. 61/295 Art. 29(2) (Sept. 13, 2007). 
329. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”, supra note 4, at 55; Jana L. Walker, Jennifer L. 
Bradley & Timothy J. Humphrey, Sr., A Closer Look at Environmental Injustice in Indian 
Country, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 379, 386-91 (2002).  
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resources, then states cannot take or adversely affect those property rights 
without prior consent.330  That seems to be a perfectly reasonable legal 
requirement. Consequently, states, and the United States, must obtain the 
FPIC of Indigenous peoples and Indian nations before engaging in the 
activities or creating the situations defined in articles 10, 11(2), 28(1), and 
29(2).  And it seems imminently reasonable that American Indian nations 
and Indigenous peoples have the FPIC option to say “no” in these 
circumstances. 
In sharp contrast, however, two of the FPIC provisions were far more 
controversial during the Declaration drafting process; article 19 is 
especially so.  Article 19 states: “States shall consult and co-operate in 
good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative 
measures that may affect them.”331  And article 32(2) states: 
States shall consult and co-operate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior 
to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories 
and other resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other 
resources.332 
The Chairperson of the WGDD from 1999–2006, Luis-Enrique 
Chávez, added the italicized language to articles 20 and 30 (articles 19 and 
32(2) in the DRIP) in his March 2006 Chairman’s revised proposal for the 
WGDD Draft.  As mentioned, the HRC adopted his revised proposal in 
June 2006 as the HRC Draft Declaration without making any substantive 
changes.  And the U.N. General Assembly adopted it as the Declaration 
 
330. The role of eminent domain and the United States’ sovereign power to take private 
property for “public use” on reservations, to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaty rights, and the 
plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs are beyond the scope of this article.  See U.S. 
CONST. amend V; COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 1050, 1053, 1057-58; United States v. Dion, 476 
U.S. 734, 746 (1986); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903); United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).  
331. G.A. Res. 61/295 (XIX) (Sept. 13, 2007) (emphases added), as reprinted in 
HENDERSON, supra note 176, at 154.  Article 19 of the Declaration was article 20 in the WGIP 
Draft Declaration and throughout the WGDD and HRC processes.  Article 20 stated in relevant 
part: “States shall obtain the free and informed consent . . . .” Id. at 166.  
332. Id. at 157 (emphases added).  This article of the Declaration was article 30 in the WGIP 
Draft and as used throughout the WGDD and HRC processes.  Article 30 stated in relevant part: 
“Indigenous people have the right . . . to require that States obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands . . . .”  Id. at 168. 
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without making any changes to the FPIC provisions.  Thus, he literally had 
the last word on the drafting of those two provisions. 
Mr. Chávez has expressly stated that he drafted these provisions as he 
did to avoid creating an Indigenous veto power.  In a 2009 book chapter, he 
wrote that one of the most sensitive, hot button issues in the entire WGDD 
process was FPIC because “it was a question of establishing whether the 
declaration could recognise a right of veto in relation to state action or 
not.”333  In his opinion, “the WGDD could not accept this.”334  He felt that 
states could not renounce their powers or responsibilities to make decisions 
on issues of public order and that the Declaration could never recognize 
greater rights for Indigenous peoples than for other members of society.335 
Thus, he amended these articles to defeat any idea of an FPIC veto right. 
He also stated: “The Chairman’s proposals therefore established only 
an obligation regarding the means (consultation and cooperation in good 
faith with a view to obtaining consent) but not, in any way, an obligation 
regarding the result, which would mean having to obtain that consent.”336 
Consequently, he dispensed with the idea of a state obligation from the 
WGIP Draft to “obtain” the consent of Indigenous peoples in articles 20 
and 30, and created only a mandatory process “in order to [attempt to] 
obtain their” consent in what became articles 19 and 32(2) of the DRIP.337 
Mr. Chávez must have accomplished his goal because it seems that no 
commentator reads FPIC, at least in article 19, to have created an 
Indigenous veto power over state actions.338  Even James Anaya, who was 
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2009–
2014, stated in an official U.N. report that article 19 “should not be 
 
333. Chávez, supra note 177, at 103.   
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337. Id. 
338. Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent, supra note 218, at 3 (noting that article 19 
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pillars”); id. at 16 (stating that human rights treaty bodies have dealt with FPIC “[t]o different 
degrees, [but] they have all accepted that FPIC cannot be understood in strict terms.”); NEWMAN, 
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to alter democratic institutions in ways that may generate further democratic deficits” and “courts 
and policy-makers [have to] continue to ensure that the duty to consult fulfills its purposes as a 
procedure but does not become an effective veto power, which it is not meant to be”); ROMBOUTS, 
supra note 235, at 87 (“FPIC should not be seen as a veto power but that the concept’s general 
aim is to fully integrate indigenous peoples into decision-making processes that affect them.”).  It 
does seem obvious for article 19 that no democratic society could function under an Indigenous 
veto power over the enactment of legislative and administrative measures.  The DRIP itself states 
pretty clearly that it cannot be read as a veto power: “The provisions set forth in this Declaration 
shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human 
rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.” G.A. Res. 61/295 (XLVI) 
(Sept. 13, 2007).  
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regarded as according indigenous peoples a general ‘veto power’ over 
decisions that may affect them, but rather as establishing consent as the 
objective of consultations.”339  At least one commentator has noted that Mr. 
Anaya retreated in this statement from positions he had taken in his earlier 
writings.340  
 It is extremely interesting, though, that the DRIP article 19 was 
apparently read, in sharp contrast to Mr. Chávez’ comments, as recognizing 
an Indigenous veto power by the four countries that voted against the 
Declaration in the U.N. General Assembly. Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States all specifically cited article 19 and its veto 
power for Indigenous peoples as one of the four reasons they voted against 
the DRIP.341  (Perhaps this claim was just a “democratic” smoke screen to 
cover other reasons these countries really voted against the DRIP?). 
Moreover, throughout the WGIP, WGDD, HRC Draft, and U.N. General 
Assembly processes, many states vehemently objected to these articles 
because they allegedly created a veto power for Indigenous peoples over the 
legislative and administrative powers of states, and over the approval of 
development projects in Indigenous lands.  States made countless 
suggestions to amend those articles. 
Notwithstanding Chairman Chávez’s 2009 statements, and the 
interpretation almost everyone gives articles 19 and 32(2), is it possible that 
the articles require states to consult with Indigenous peoples, “so as to” or 
“in order to” obtain their consent?  What does “in order to” really mean in 
those articles?  Is it possible that the phrase means that states shall use the 
defined process—consulting and cooperating with Indigenous peoples— 
and that states “shall” obtain FPIC? 
In sum, it appears fairly certain that the FPIC provisions in articles 10, 
11(1), 28(1), and 29 are not controversial because they entail property and 
human rights that Indigenous peoples own and possess.  In addition, it is 
clear these articles mandate States, including the United States, to obtain 
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argued in his scholarly work for a broader application of FPIC than in this new analysis as the 
Special Rapporteur; Anaya “opts for the more limited conception of consultation envisioned by 
one side within the ongoing scholarly debate on this issue and thus somewhat moves back from 
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Indigenous peoples’ consent before undertaking the actions defined in those 
articles.  For some reason, though, article 32(2) was controversial even 
though it also concerns lands or resources owned by Indigenous peoples. 
States were no doubt very leery of Indigenous peoples stalling economic 
development activities on and off lands they actually own.  And it must be 
remembered that worldwide many Indigenous peoples’ lands are not yet 
demarcated, and their rights are not well-defined under domestic laws. 
Thus, states must have been worried about exactly what lands and rights 
might be protected in 32(2). 
But based on the WGDD Chairman’s explanation of the changes he 
made to that article from the WGIP Draft Declaration, and the opinion of 
almost all commentators, article 32(2) does not require states to obtain 
consent but only to engage in a mandatory consultation and cooperation 
procedure “in order to” obtain consent.  Finally, there also seems to be no 
controversy, according to Chávez and all the commentators, that article 19 
does not require states to obtain consent from Indigenous peoples before 
enacting administrative and legislative measures that might impact them. 
Once again, states are only required to engage in mandatory good faith 
consultations and cooperation “in order to” obtain the consent of 
Indigenous peoples.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The principle that Indigenous peoples have the right to free, prior, and 
informed consent, or not to consent, to matters that affect their property 
rights and lands will continue to be a serious, ongoing, and evolving issue 
in the international arena.342  In fact, a wide array of international 
conventions, organizations, and courts now require at least meaningful 
consultations with Indigenous peoples and often require their prior 
consent.343  A few countries have codified consultation and consent 
requirements in their constitutions and laws.344  And even private interests 
are voluntarily or involuntarily getting involved in FPIC issues.345  In 
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addition, in 2011 the International Finance Corporation, which is a part of 
the World Bank, adopted a performance standard that requires entities that 
are using its funding to obtain FPIC from the Indigenous peoples regarding 
environmental and social sustainability issues raised by their projects.346 
The United States will of course also be faced with decisions on how to 
respond to this evolving issue. 
I view the FPIC issue in the United States from five different 
viewpoints: (1) through the lens of the United States fairly consistent 
practice of dealing with Indian nations via consensual, diplomatic, and 
political means; (2) with the understanding that American Indian nations 
and Indian peoples own lands and various property rights that properly raise 
FPIC issues; (3) with the backdrop that the United States has a fiduciary 
trust responsibility for Indian nations and Indian peoples; (4) from a 
practical angle, it appears easier and less expensive for the United States to 
deal with Indian nations in this modern-day on an FPIC basis; and (5) that 
article 19 of the Declaration should never be read as an Indigenous veto 
over democratic principles.  I conclude that viewed from these vantage 
points, FPIC is not such a new or alarming idea for the United States, and it 
is not that much of a change in the context of Indian nations and the U.S. 
First, as discussed in Parts II and III, the history and the generally 
accepted practice in the United States has been to deal with tribal nations on 
a consensual treaty, diplomatic, and political basis.  I am well aware that 
Indian nations and Indian peoples suffered greatly under federal policies 
and laws and American “Manifest Destiny.”347  I am not holding the United 
States up as some kind of utopian model for its dealings with Indigenous 
peoples.  In fact, many commentators and historians have accurately argued 
that the United States pursued genocidal policies against Indian peoples.348 
But the practices and laws that the United States claimed to utilize vis-à-vis 
Indian nations for the past two hundred plus years does not appear to differ 
that much from what is required under FPIC principles.  The modern-day 
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federal policies and laws discussed above, and the attempts to improve 
federal consultations with Indian nations, shows that federal officials and 
policy makers are moving closer and closer to most of the FPIC provisions 
explicated in the U.N. Declaration. 
Second, and most significant to me, is that all but one of the six FPIC 
provisions concern lands, assets, property rights, and human rights owned 
and possessed by Indigenous peoples.  In the context of United States 
Indian law and policies, it is not surprising that Indian nations have well-
recognized property rights and sovereign powers to consent, or not, to 
proposals that use, take, or significantly impact their rights.349  Even article 
32(2) of the DRIP, which was so controversial in the WGDD drafting 
process, and which WGDD Chairman Chávez unilaterally amended to 
avoid an “Indigenous veto,”350 is solely about lands and resources owned by 
Indigenous peoples. Consequently, the United States ought to support and 
enforce this FPIC provision as well as the four other non-controversial 
FPIC provisions. 
A third reason for the United States to support at least five of the FPIC 
provisions is the federal trust responsibility.  This article has barely 
mentioned this important topic, but it is very relevant when defining the 
duties the United States owes Indian nations and peoples, which should 
include consulting and acquiring their consent before taking or seriously 
impacting their rights.351  According to the United States Supreme Court, 
the United States,  
[u]nder a humane and self imposed policy which has found 
expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of 
this Court, [ ] has charged itself with moral obligations of the 
highest responsibility and trust.  Its conduct, as disclosed in the 
acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should 
therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.352  
 
349. See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions 
About Natural Resource Extraction, 22 ARIZ. J INT’L & COMP. L. 17, 17 (2005) (“[W]here 
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Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 
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352. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (footnote omitted). 
         
2015] CONSULTATION OR CONSENT 97 
The Congress and Executive Branch are well aware of their legal 
responsibilities to tribal nations under this fiduciary duty and regularly 
reference the trust responsibility in federal laws and regulations.353  It seems 
obvious that the United States would be violating its trust duties if it 
unilaterally takes the property and human rights of Indian nations and 
peoples without consulting them first and without obtaining their consent. 
Five of the six FPIC provisions seem to be implicated in the trust 
obligations the United States possesses in regards American Indians and the 
Indian nations. 
Fourth, I see very practical reasons for the United States to deal with 
Indian nations in this modern-day on an FPIC basis.  It is far easier and less 
expensive for the Congress and Executive Branch to fully and fairly consult 
with tribal nations and to secure their consent before taking steps that 
impact Indian rights. Tribal governments are more powerful and capable 
today, and some are very well-funded now.  In addition, they are very 
effective at lobbying Congress and the public, and in hiring lobbyists and 
attorneys to fight for their rights.  Thus, perhaps even “selfish” pecuniary 
and political interests—solid practical reasons—mandate that the United 
States is better served by working with tribes on an FPIC basis and not by 
unilateral actions.354 
Finally, the sixth FPIC provision, article 19, seems to be another 
matter.  Article 20 of the WGIP Draft clearly recognized an Indigenous veto 
power over states enacting legislative or administrative measures that 
impacted Indigenous peoples.  As detailed above, states vigorously fought 
that idea, and the WGDD Chairman amended the provision that became 
article 19 in the DRIP to negate any idea of an Indigenous veto in this 
situation.  The commentators uniformly agree that article 19 does not create 
a veto power.  They agree, though, that states must still consult with 
Indigenous peoples and attempt to obtain consent on these matters.  In a 
democratic society, I believe that article 19 has to be read in that fashion.  
In fact, no matter how article 19 might have ultimately been worded, the 
DRIP itself states that all its provisions must be interpreted “in accordance 
with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, 
non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.”355  Pursuant to an 
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interpretation that article 19 only guarantees Indigenous peoples the right to 
participate in the democratic process, over the past six decades, American 
Indian nations have become heavily involved and effective in the political 
process of the United States; they are effective in working to ensure that 
their rights and opinions are considered seriously and taken into account in 
any legislative or administrative measures that might impact them. 
In conclusion, the United States seems to have little reason to fear the 
Declaration and seems to have had little legitimate reason to vote no in 
2007.  In line with its official statement of support for the Declaration in 
2010, its trust responsibility, and its efforts of the past few decades in 
regards to tribal consultations, the United States should improve its 
consultation processes with Indian nations by not undertaking actions that 
impact the property, human rights, and sovereign powers of Indian nations 
and Indian peoples without their consent.  The federal process of working 
with Indian nations and peoples should not be a question of consultation or 
consent, but should be a relationship based on consultation and consent. 
 
